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The soul, doubtless, is immortal-where a soul can be discerned.
-Robert Browning, A Tocatta of Galuppi's
Abortion, euthanasia, and the death penalty have sparked
emotional public debates for the past three decades. Just as these
controversies over life- termination have forced us to think systema-
tically about ethics in the public domain, new technologies of life-
extension will provoke controversy in the twenty-first century.
Known generally as regenerative medicine, the new health care
seeks not only to cure disease but to arrest the aging process itself.
So far, public attention to regenerative medicine has focused on
two of its methods: embryonic stem-cell research and therapeutic
cloning. Since both processes manipulate embryos, they alarm many
religious groups, particularly those that believe life begins at concep-
tion. Such religious objections have dominated headlines on the
topic, and were central to President Bush's decision to restrict stem-
cell research.
Although they are now politically potent, the present religious
objections to regenerative medicine will soon become irrelevant.
Scientists are fast developing new ways of culturing the biological
materials now exclusively produced by embryos. Given their expres-
sed commitment to the "sanctity of life," religious leaders will soon
find the tables turned: researchers will accuse them of causing death
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if they fail to support medicine that cures the sick without harming
embryos.
Perhaps anticipating this development, those uneasy with regener-
ative medicine have tried to shift the debate to focus on its long-term
effects. They believe that innovations that now look benign might
lead to an era of untrammeled biotechnological manipulation of our
lives. For example, the same technology used to eliminate disease-
causing genes or to clone embryos may eventually be deployed to
produce genetically engineered children. That could, in turn, en-
trench class differences, since only the wealthy could afford the most
desirable genetic enhancements.2
Such objections may be speculative. Nevertheless, they deserve
more attention, not necessarily as predictions of the future, but as
indictments of the present. We are all disturbed by hypothetical
dystopias like Brave New World' But their most important flaws-
the inequality, degradation, and moral irresponsibility of their
inhabitants-are already apparent in the distribution of regenerative
therapies. The world's wealthiest nations spend hundreds of millions
of dollars on elaborate technologies of life-extension, while contri-
buting only trivially to efforts to assure basic medical care to the
poorest. Public debate on regenerative medicine must acknowledge
this inequality. Societies and individuals can invest in it in good con-
science only if they are seriously committed to extending extant
medicine to all.
Unfortunately, regenerative therapies threaten to undermine the
very moral commitments that allow us to recognize the inappropri-
ateness of their present pursuit. Human beings have always sought to
live up to some normative standards. When medical science could
only delay death, these standards always took certain forms, forms
that I call "positive immortality." As promised by both secular and
religious humanists, positive immortality consists in the identification
of the self with the timeless. It encourages the pursuit of goals and
the adoption of roles governed by the standards of a shared human
community. Regenerative medicine now promises a new normativity
for humans, the prospect of indefinite self-preservation. Whereas old
aspirations to immortality depended on some positive creation or
2. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Law of Above Averages: Leveling the New Genetic
Enhancement Playing Field, 85 IOWA L. REV. 517 (2000).
3. Huxley's novel speculated about the nature of human society in the twenty-seventh
century. Huxley imagined the inhabitants of this "brave new world" would be engineered, via
embryonic manipulation, to enjoy continuous but empty and quiescient contentment. The
society was rigidly stratified into classes "designed" for different types of work. See ALDOUS
HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932). Huxley explicitly connected his famous dystopia to
present technologies in later works. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED
(1958).
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action, "negative immortality" hinges simply on survival, the evasion
of death.'
Regenerative therapies entail not just an extension of life, but a
shift in our basic attitudes towards death. Instead of trying to cast the
stem-cell controversy in terms of "science versus religion" or "pro-
life versus pro-choice," journalists and scholars should consider
positive and negative concepts of immortality as truer normative
poles for the debate on regenerative medicine. This article enables
such a shift in perspective by examining the causes, consequences,
and philosophical bases of negative immortality.
Journalists and scholars have so far designated the "sides" in this
debate as pro-life and pro-choice, or religion and science. By
examining testimony at committee hearings on stem-cell research,
Part I demonstrates that this dichotomy distorts the controversy. The
religious opponents of stem-cell research have rarely questioned its
ultimate aims. Far from being dispassionate scientists, many of the
researchers advocate a salvific role for medicine in human life.
Many of the stem-cell researchers profess only to want to cure
disease. However, it is difficult in principle to distinguish targeted
regenerative therapies from the endless replacement of body parts
eagerly anticipated on the fringes of the field. Once such prosthetics
become widespread, the "downloading" of memory, intellect, and
will onto a medium more durable than the brain is a logical next step
-- and is now being explored by artificial intelligence researchers.
Unmoored from past biological limits, the new science seems to
consider the body little more than an inconvenient container for the
mind. I explore this problem in Part II.
In Part III, I argue that the consequences of this conception of the
body cannot be fully understood unless we situate negative immor-
tality in a field of contemporary ontological and ideological commit-
ments. Secular and religious humanisms encourage individuals to
identify with some roles or standards beyond the self, generating
positive ideals of immortality. These ideals are endangered by the
4. I hope to be fairer here to negative immortality than Isaiah Berlin was to "positive
liberty" in his essay Two Concepts of Liberty. In that essay, Berlin affirmed the value of
"negative liberty"-the bare capacity to do as one wills-in comparison with "positive liberty,"
the freedom associated with the exercise of virtues or activities deemed valuable within some
ideological framework. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1961). Berlin
intimated that positive liberty was inevitably intertwined with totalitarianism, a highly con-
testable claim to be sure. To some extent, my concept of negative immortality is analogous
with the concept of negative liberty: both describe states in which an individual is capable of
doing what he wills. Positive immortality, like positive liberty, is premised on leading a good
life according to some conception of human flourishing. Thus my own critique of negative
immortality echoes some leading criticisms of Berlin's dichotomy. See, e.g., CHARLES TAY-
LOR, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty, in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND
THE HUMAN SCIENCES 224 (1985).
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pursuit of negative immortality, since the horizons of value that give
meaning to the pursuit of positive immortality would not be shared
by those pursuing indefinite self-preservation. Its pursuit would sup-
plant socially recognized survival with scientifically verified survival.
To the extent that people come to accept the very idea of the latter,
the former withers.
Once properly contextualized, the pursuit of indefinite self-preser-
vation appears either futile or self-defeating. Part IV examines
whether any version of negative immortality would actually preserve
the person who chooses it. It concludes that negative immortality is
less about preserving oneself than it is about identifying oneself with
some aspect of one's identity-be it one's genes, body, or thoughts-
that can be preserved. Even if preserving all these aspects of the self
were possible, it may not be desirable. By analogizing from more
proximate technological advances, we can better understand the
shortcomings of the new biotechnology.
Admittedly, these critiques do not touch directly on the incremen-
tal advances of regenerative medicine. Nevertheless, they indicate
how its pursuit threatens to distract us from the most important
questions confronting our society. Given the vast inequality of life
chances prevailing in the world, the elite pursuit of technologies of
life-extension threatens to desensitize its devotees to the fate of
those unable to command even basic medical care. After examining
the distributional consequences of regenerative therapies, Part V
argues that even the most incremental advances should be pursued
cautiously, if at all.
Part VI concludes with reflections on the personal and political
choices raised by the new technologies of negative immortality. As
medical science advances, questions concerning the proper allocation
of public and private resources to health care will become increas-
ingly urgent. We cannot consign these queries to technocratic cost-
benefit analyses. The answers must ultimately depend on our con-
sidered attitudes toward death and immortality.
I. THE DISTORTED DEBATE OVER STEM-CELL RESEARCH AND
CLONING
Many consider immortality the exclusive preserve of theological
speculation. Recently, however, scientists have begun to employ the
term. By researching ways of synthetically replacing human tissues,
medical researchers have begun to raise the stakes of their interven-
tions, from fighting disease to vanquishing death itself According to
5. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE 58 (1993). Callahan, the
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William Haseltine, leader of a major biotechnology company, "It's a
reasonable conjecture that we age because our stem cells age, and
that if we were able to replace them with new and younger cells, we
could continue healthy life in perpetuity."6 If stem cells can be stimu-
lated to grow into replacement tissues and organs, "[d]eath itself can
be considered a disease."7 Emboldened by the new technology, a
small cult in France and Canada aims to use similar scientific
techniques to clone individuals, in an effort to assure them deathless
genes.8
These developments have provoked Congress, the President, and
the public to scrutinize biotechnology. Over ten bills have been
introduced in the 107th Congress relating to stem-cell research and
cloning.9 House and Senate Committee hearings have featured
testimony from doctors and lawyers, scientists and philosophers."°
Every shade of religious opinion, ranging from Catholic to cloning-
cult dogma, has been aired. But the testimony has focused on a very
narrow question: namely, the legitimacy of certain experiments
involving embryos.
Both sides have gained by narrowing the debate in this way. By
focusing on the embryos to be harmed, "pro-life" forces deflected
attention from a morbid consequence of their advocacy: namely, an
founder of the Hastings Center, observes that modern medicine has come, "in its working
research, and often [in its] clinical agenda, to look upon death as a correctable biological
deficiency." Id.
6. Nicholas Wade, Apostle of Regenerative Medicine Foresees Longer Health and Life,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2001, at D1 (quoting Haseltine, Chairman of Human Genome Sciences,
who argues that "there is no reason we can't go on forever").
7. Ronald Bailey, Petri Dish Politics, REASON, Dec. 1, 1999, at 33 (quoting biochemist
Cynthia Kenyon).
8. Margaret Talbot, A Desire to Duplicate: Is This How Human Cloning will Begin ?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001 (Magazine), at 40 (describing the Raelians, a group whose tenets include
the promotion of cloning as a form of resurrection). The group has posted its aims and tenets
on the Internet. See www.rael.org. Although technology only now seems capable of achieving
cloning, it has long raised similar enthusiasms. See MARTIN EBON, THE CLONING OF MAN 4
(1978) (discussing debates over cloning occasioned by early advances in human genetics re-
search).
9. For an introduction to the science of stem cells, see NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH,
STEM CELLS: A PRIMER (2001), at http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcellprimer.htm. Some of the
proposed bills include The Stem Cell Research Act of 2001, H.R. 2059.IH, 107th Cong. (2001);
The Responsible Stem Cell Research Act of 2001, S. 1349.IS, 107th Cong. (2001); The New
Century Health Advantage Act, H.R. 2838.IH, 107th Cong. (2001); The Cell Development
Research Act of 2001, H.R. 2863.IH, 107th Cong. (2001); and The Human Cloning Prohibition
Act of 2001, H.R. 1644.IH, 107th Cong. (2001).
10. See Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001: Hearings on HR. 1644 Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the House Energy and Commerce Comm., 107th Cong. (2000),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/O620200lHearing291/hearing.htm
[hereinafter "House Hearing on Cloning Prohibition"]; Human Cloning Prohibition Act of
2001: Hearings on S 709 Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the
Senate Commerce Comm., 107th Cong. (2001), available at http://www.senate.gov/-commerce/
issues/scitech.htm [hereinafter "Senate Hearing on Cloning Prohibition"].
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almost certain delay in the development of treatment for many fatal
illnesses. On the other side, scientists have engaged in a debate that
supposedly turned on facts, not values: the precise definition of zy-
gote, pre-embryo, and embryo, rather than the consequences, goals,
and availability of their research. As long as they have engaged in a
familiar battle over the definition of life, neither side has had to
defend its ultimate commitments.
Fortunately, secular critics of regenerative therapies have raised
concerns about not only its methods, but its goals. They have focused
on the type of society likely to be created if regenerative therapies
become commonplace. Suspecting what the technologies may drag in
their wake, several have invoked Brave New World and other dys-
topian futures. Although such concerns are conjectural, they provide
an effective means of addressing the spectrum of issues raised by
regenerative medicine, rather than simply focusing on narrow
opposition to one of its present techniques.
A. Background of the Debate
Disputes over abortion, palliative care, and assisted suicide have
made the definition of life a hotly contested political issue. Should a
fetus acquire the rights of a person when it looks like one, or when it
can sense like one? Does a patient condemned to a lifetime of excru-
ciating pain or persistent vegetative status have a life worth living?"
Does a brain-dead person even live?12
Our conceptions of what life is-as coded into law, hospital policy,
ethics, and common parlance-determine our answers to these ques-
tions. These answers in turn shape our conceptions of life. 3 Like
11. Cases concerning a "right to die" have reached the U.S. Supreme Court. See Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 267 (1990); and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
Judges around the world have grappled with the question of whether there is a "right to die."
See 2 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 19 (Paul Gewirtz & Jacob Katz Cogan eds., 1998) (col-
lecting cases such as Rodriguez v. British Columbia, Washington v. Glucksberg, Airedale
N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, and Shefer v. Israel).
12. According to a U.S. Government commission, "An individual who has sustained either
1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or 2) irreversible cessation of
all function of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINA-
TION OF DEATH 73 (1981). But see KAREN GRANDSTRAND GERVAIS, REDEFINING DEATH 3
(1986) (noting that "[tihere has been some debate over whether death is a process or an event.
If it is a process, how are we to settle on a precise time of its occurrence? How are we to force
it into the language of events? If it is an event, how do we explain the obvious biological situa-
tion that deterioration, destruction, and decay are not isolated events but gradual processes?").
See also DAVID W. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING §§ 2:1-
2:9 (1981 & Supp. 1992) (discussing stages in "process of dying").
13. See, e.g., ROBERT BURT, DEATH IS THAT MAN TAKING NAMES: INTERSECIONS OF
AMERICAN LAW, MEDICINE, AND CULTURE (forthcoming 2002); Editorial, Oregon Cuts
Funds for Pain Care -Pays for Assisted Suicide, 14 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 339 (1998).
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principles of the common law that emerge from holdings in indi-
vidual cases,' a rough societal consensus is beginning to crystallize
moral judgments about whether particular medical interventions are
legitimate. 5
But just as this provisional settlement emerges, research on new
technologies of life-extension threatens to shatter it. 6 Medical re-
search utilizing human tissues has been controversial since the
1980s. 7 Experimentation with human sperm and egg cells, embryos,
and fetuses has attracted criticism from pro-life groups. 8 In 1995,
spurred by the Family Research Council, the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops, and other pro-life groups, the Republican-con-
trolled Congress began passing a series of riders to appropriations
bills for the Department of Health and Human Services restricting
the use of embryos in research. The 1998 riders provided that "that
federal funds may not be used for":
(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research
purposes; or
(2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroy-
ed, discarded or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death
greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero under
45 C.F.R. 46.208(a)(2) and section 498(b) of the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 289g(b)). 9
The legislation defined the term "embryo" as "any organism.., that
is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other
means from one or more human gametes or human diploid cells."'2
As science in the area advanced, it generated uncertainty regarding
exactly what Congress had proscribed.
Political support for the riders weakened as scientists concluded
that embryo research would be increasingly important to new medi-
cal breakthroughs. By 1998, scientists developed new methods of
14. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
15. See, e.g., Robin Toner, The Abortion Debate: Stuck in Time, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2001, sec. 4, at 1 (listing areas of popular consensus on abortion policy and fetal cell research).
16. See, e.g., Proceedings of the Templeton Foundation Conference on Extended and
Eternal Life, at http://www.extended-eternaUife.org.
17. See Kenneth J. Ryan, Tissue Transplantation From Aborted Fetuses, Organ Trans-
plantation From Anencephalic Infants and Keeping Brain-Dead Pregnant Women Alive Until
Fetal Viability, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (1991); Christine L. Feiler, Note, Human Embryo Ex-
peimentation: Regulation and Relative Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2435, 2439-40 (1998).
18. See, e.g., Press Release, Family Research Council, Victimization as Research: Human
Embryonic Stem Cell Experimentation (Oct. 14, 1999), athttp://www.frc.org/get/ is99g3.cfm.
19. Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 511 (1999).
20. Id.
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culturing human embryonic stem cells, which they believed could be
instrumental in developing therapies for diseases ranging from Alz-
heimer's disease to diabetes." Eager to sponsor the research, the
director of the National Institutes of Health (Harold Varmus) sought
legal advice from the general counsel of the Department of Health
and Human Services (Harriet Rabb) in order to determine whether
NIH could sponsor embryonic stem-cell research.'2 Since private
researchers had recently cultured "lines" of stem cells from embryos
they had consigned to destruction, Varmus believed that federal
researchers could use these lines without being personally respon-
sible for harming any embryo. Rabb agreed. She stated that human
pluripotent stem cells, even if derived from an embryo, did not count
as "embryos" within the statutory definition because they were not
organisms. She therefore believed that the proposed research would
not violate the law.
This interpretation provoked protests from the Congressional
sponsors of the riders, who believed that the interpretation violated
both the letter and spirit of the relevant law. Nevertheless, the
Clinton Administration backed Rabb and Varmus and endorsed the
research. Buoyed by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission's
recent endorsement of stem-cell research, Secretary of Health and
Human Services Donna Shalala assured Congressional sponsors that
no federally sponsored research would directly result in the
destruction of an embryo. Still offended by the research, pro-life
forces vowed to make it a campaign issue, and then-Governor Bush
vowed to end it if elected President. Once elected, Bush had to
decide whether to keep this pledge. He ultimately decided to back
very limited research, based on about sixty "lines" of stem cells then
cultured by private researchers at the time of his announcement.'
Bush reasoned that the "life-and-death decision" to utilize these
embryos for research had already been made, and that the cells'
regenerative capacities would render these lines sufficient to satisfy
current research needs.
21. See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN
STEM CELL RESEARCH 29 (1999).
22. Varmus specifically asked, via letter, "whether federal funds may be used for research
conducted with human pluripotent stem cells derived from embryos created by in vitro
fertilization or from primordial germ cells isolated from the tissue of non-living fetuses." See
Sharon M. Parker, Comment, Bringing Pope John Paul II's Encyclical The Gospel of Life to
American Jurisprudence. A Religious, Ethical and Philosophical Critique of Federal Funding
for Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 17 J. CONTEMP. H. L. & POL'Y 771, 776 (2001) (quoting a
memorandum dated Jan. 15, 1999 from Harriet Rabb, General Counsel of the Department of
Health and Human Services, to Dr. Harold Varmus, Director of the National Institutes of
Health).
23. See George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Stem Cell Research, Aug. 9, 2001,
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html.
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While Bush agonized over the decision, Congress considered a
number of bills responding to the stem-cell debate and to a new
innovation: human cloning. Unlike the stem-cell issue, a cloning ban
was not very controversial; nearly everyone supported it. But spon-
sors quickly found that it was difficult to craft a bill that would both
outlaw cloning and leave unaffected legitimate private research
endeavors utilizing embryonic material. Several private researchers
argued for an exception for research on "therapeutic" cloning-the
splicing of nuclear material from an ill individual into a stem cell, so
that that stem cell develops into a tissue that can replace diseased
tissue from the ill individual. These researchers argued that the same
techniques proposed for cloning an entire human being were integral
to the development of tissue for regenerative therapies. Two rival
bills emerged as responses to the situation. Conservative Republican
Dave Weldon proposed criminalizing all cloning of embryos, and
punishing offenders with jail terms of up to ten years and fines up to
one million dollars. Another Republican representative would have
barred only reproductive cloning designed to create embryos. 4 The
Weldon bill was passed by the House.
B. Objections to Stem-CellResearch
Although the Senate failed to pass the Weldon Bill, Congress will
eventually revisit legislation on stem-cell research and cloning.25
When it does, the most vocal opponents of the research will likely be
representatives of religious groups. The Catholic Church and many
Protestant denominations have provided the most organized oppo-
sition to stem-cell research. 6 Given that the research now focuses on
manipulation of cells from embryos, their spokesmen frame the issue
as a natural outgrowth of their pro-life stance against abortion,
euthanasia, and (for Catholics) the death penalty. In his prepared
24. See Nancy Gibbs, Cloning: Where Do You Draw The Line?, TIME, Aug. 13, 2001, at
18. Gibbs summarized the arguments about the bill in this way: "Shut that research down,
argue the scientists, and the most promising frontier in medicine is suddenly off limits. Let it
proceed, say opponents, and you have crossed a line toward the manufacture of humans as
tools, and there is no going back." Id.
25. See Jennifer Powell, ACT Chief Defends Company's Embryo Cell Work, BOSTON
HERALD, Dec. 4, 2001, at 0-35 (reporting that "efforts to immediately halt human cloning
fizzled in the U.S. Senate yesterday"); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Controversy over Cloning
Reignites in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2001, at A15.
26. Of course, not all religious groups oppose the research. Mormon Senators Orrin Hatch
and Gordon Smith have strongly supported embryonic stem-cell research. See Drew Clark,
The Mormon Stem-Cell Choir, SLATE, Aug. 3, 2001, available at http://slate.msn.com/?id=
112974. Leon Kass has identified diverse Jewish positions on the issue. See Leon R. Kass,
L'Chaim andIts Limits: WhyNot Immortality?, FIRST THINGS, May 2001, at 17.
27. Pope John Paul II has vigorously developed and defended Catholic doctrine opposing
contraception abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty, and the manipulation of embryonic tis-
2002]
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testimony in favor of the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001,
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops' spokesman
Richard Doerflinger argued that cloning would inevitably result in
"exploiting and destroying fellow human beings."29 Like spokesmen
from the Family Research Council and the Methodist church, Doer-
flinger argued that cloning, even when not intended to produce new
human organisms, offends the "sanctity and dignity of human life."3
All agreed that manipulation of embryos would erode ethical safe-
guards essential to principled medical research.
Despite that concord, their warnings rang hollow in important
ways. Whereas euthanasia and executions result in the end of a life,
reproductive cloning actually creates life. Furthermore, therapeutic
cloning promises to cure the sick by "regenerating" their aging
bodily tissues. How could pro-lifers oppose that?
Most have responded by narrowly limiting their opposition to
embryonic stem-cell research (ESCR), and insisting that all its
touted aims could be accomplished with adult stem-cell research
(ASCR). Since these cells are derived from a patient's own bone
marrow, they raised none of the issues about embryos that had vexed
Catholic and other religious leaders." Shortly before President
Bush's announcement on the topic, Doerflinger publicized "a start-
ling breakthrough.., showing that adult stem cells from bone mar-
row can be directed to provide an abundant and accessible supply of
nerve cells for transplant."32 Despite skepticism among scientists,
sue. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE: ON THE VALUE AND INVIOLABILITY OF
HUMAN LIFE (1995), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/encyclicals/
documents/hfjp-ii-enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae en.html; CATHOLIC CHURCH, CONGRE-
GATIO PRO DOCTRINA FIDEI, DONUM VITAE: INSTRUCTION ON RESPECr FOR HUMAN LIFE
IN ITS ORIGIN AND THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION (1987).
28. House Hearing on Cloning Prohibition, supra note 10.
29. Id at 78-87 (statement of Richard Doerflinger).
30. Id.
31. The Coalition of Americans for Research Ethics (CARE), a leading group of oppo-
nents of embryonic stem-cell research (ESCR), has no ethical objections to adult stem-cell
research (ASCR). The Coalition is a signatory to a document signed by many critics of embry-
onic stem-cell research which calls for the development of adult stem-cell research. See
CENTER FOR BIOETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, ON HUMAN EMBRYOS AND STEM CELL
RESEARCH: AN APPEAL FOR LEGALLY AND ETHICALLY RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY, at http://www.stemcellresearch.org/statement/statement.htm (reporting that "the
British Medical Journal remarked on January 30, 1999, that the use of embryonic stem cells
'may soon be eclipsed by the more readily available and less controversial adult stem cells"');
see also DAVID A. PRENTICE, POTENTIAL CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF ADULT STEM CELLS,
at http://www.stemcellresearch.orglinfo/potentialaps-novl8.pdf. The website for the Coalition
of Americans for Research Ethics can be found at http://www.stemcellresearch.org.
32. Richard Doerflinger, Science and Morality No Conflict, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS LIFE ISSUES FORUM, Aug. 18,2000, athttp://www.nccbuscc.org/prolife/
publicat/lifeissues/08182000.htm. Numerous other religious commentators have celebrated
ASCR as a gift from God.
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religious leaders are eager to demonstrate that adult stem cells and
other biological materials may provide the same research oppor-
tunities as embryonic stem cells.3
Their enthusiasm is not merely a capitulation to political realities.
Many opponents of stem-cell research are deeply sympathetic with
its aims, welcoming new medical technologies as gifts from God. So
far, concerns over embryos have trumped religious humanitarians'
concern for the sick?' But new methods of regenerative medicine
may convert the most vehement opponents of stem-cell research into
ardent devotees. For example, Roman Catholic bioethicists often
insist that "as long a treatment is beneficial in sustaining life and not
burdensome, there is an obligation to use it."3 As medical tech-
nology advances, the line between avoidable and unavoidable deaths
is vanishing- creating countervailing pressures for critics of stem-cell
research to acknowledge its potentially life-saving impact.
When "research advocates often argue that a failure to allocate
money to the search for a cure of a lethal disease... will leave the
blood of the continuing deaths on the hands of those who deny the
money," questioning the goals of medical research may seem
inhumane.6 Nevertheless, the testimony offered by the few secular
critics of therapeutic cloning invited to appear before Congress
suggests that unqualified support for adult stem-cell research may be
unwise. The secular critics shifted the focus of the debate from
particular embryonic interventions to the social consequences of
regenerative medicine. Judy Norsignian, a coauthor of Our Bodies,
Ourselves, opposed therapeutic cloning because it "would make it all
but impossible to enforce the ban on the creation of fully formed
human clones." 7 She also warned that the research "would pave the
way for unprecedented new forms of eugenics."3 Francis Fuku-
yama's testimony on the Cloning Prohibition Act also raised the
specter of widespread genetic engineering.39
33. See Andrew Pollack, Scientists Seek Ways to Rebuild the Body, Bypassing the
Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,2001, at F6.
34. See Jane E. Brody, Weighing the Rights of the Embryo Against Those of the Sick,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,2001, at F8.
35. CALLAHAN, supra note 5, at 70. Callahan is not relating his views here, but rather is
focusing on Catholic teaching distinguishing between "ordinary means" that must be used to
extend life and "extraordinary means" that may be utilized at the discretion of patients and
doctors. Id.
36. Id. at 65.
37. See House Hearing on Cloning Prohibition, supra note 10, at 76-78 (statement of Judy
Norsignian).
38. Id
39. Id. at 87-91 (statement of Francis Fukuyama). Fukuyama testified that even thera-
peutic cloning should be banned because it could be "the opening wedge for a series of future
technologies that will permit us to alter the human germline and ultimately to design people
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The new chair of President Bush's Bioethics Advisory Council,
Leon Kass, has also explored the social consequences and ultimate
goals of advanced medical research. At the committee hearings, he
cited Aldous Huxley's dystopia, Brave New World, as a cautionary
tale deeply appropriate for an age eager to master the manipulation
of embryonic and genetic material.' The warning echoed his earlier
public statements about the moral dilemmas raised by biotech-
nology:
[C]ontemplating present and projected advances in genetic and
reproductive technologies, in neuroscience and psychopharma-
cology, and in the development of artificial organs and com-
puter-chip implants for human brains, we now clearly recognize
new uses for biotechnical power that soar beyond the traditional
medical goals of healing disease and relieving suffering. Human
nature itself lies on the operating table, ready for alteration, for
eugenic and psychic "enhancement," for wholesale re-design41
Some may argue that it is unfair to base opposition to any particular
technology on the results of adopting similar technologies.42 But Kass
does a service to the debate by shifting attention from the methods
to the goals of the new research. As medicine moves from reparative
to regenerative and genetically engineered models of "health,"
circumspect consideration of the cumulative impact of the new tech-
nologies is essential.
A brief thought experiment confirms the importance of a broader
perspective. Imagine that scientists were capable of chemically syn-
thesizing sperms, eggs, and embryos. Would objections to research
on these entities-which would destroy no humanly created em-
bryos-simply cease? Presumably not. Such artificial manipulation
of life seems just as repulsive, if not more so, than the artificial
destruction of embryos. Yet publicized perspectives on stem-cell
research have focused almost entirely on the latter, leaving critics ill-
equipped to devise a principled response to the former. Those who
are intuitively uncomfortable with the direction of regenerative ther-
apies must now focus on the potential consequences of the research.
genetically." Id.
40. Id. at 50-55 (statement of Leon Kass).
41. Leon R. Kass, Preventing a Brave New World: Why We Should Ban Human Cloning
Now, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 21, 2001, at 22, available at http://www.thenewrepublic.com/
052101/kass52101-print.html (arguing that "the so-called science-fiction cases-say, Brave
New World-make vivid the meaning of what looks to us, mistakenly, to be benign").
42. See Chris Mooney, Irrationalist-in-Chief, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 24, 2001, available at
http://www.prospect.org/printV12/17/mooney-c.html (arguing that Kass criticizes beneficial
technologies because of unjustified speculation that they will eventually become harmful).
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II. PATHS TO NEGATIVE IMMORTALITY
Focus on the long-term effects of the new medical research may
appear unduly speculative at this time. Nevertheless, it is not pre-
mature. Whatever the ultimate fate of the anti-cloning bill and
Bush's stem-cell compromise, the debate over the issues is likely to
prove historically important. The new medical research has sparked
a public controversy over technology reminiscent of bitter struggles
over nuclear power and recombinant DNA research in the 1970s and
1980s.43 Given the rapid advances in biotechnology throughout the
1990s, sustained public attention is long overdue. In order to broad-
en our perspective -from the moral status of embryos to the social
consequences of manipulating human embryonic and genetic mater-
ial-it is important to review synoptically the new opportunities for
"survival" recently promised by scientists. Leading biotechnicians
anticipate the development of radically expanded human capacities.
As research into biotechnology and artificial intelligence advances,
opportunities for negative immortality are becoming more concrete.
Genetic replication and organ replacement are the two central pro-
jects of research into life-extension. They are amplified in artificial
intelligence research into deathless vehicles for the mind.
A. Organ Replacement
The quest for a permanently preserved body has long been
mocked. Woody Allen's film Sleeper lampooned cryogenic fantasies
of the 1970s. The technical clumsiness of the procedure, along with
some early mishaps, made it an easy target for derision." Just as the
myth of Tithonus served as a cautionary tale in ancient Greece,45
modern satirists have mocked the egotistical for technological over-
reaching.
Now scientists and journalists are not nearly as dismissive of
projects with eerily similar aspirations. ' The promise of scientifically
verified immortality has gained credibility with every successful
43. For academic analyses of these debates, see ROGER SHATTUCK, FORBIDDEN KNOWL-
EDGE: FROM PROMETHEUS TO PORNOGRAPHY 176 (1996); LANGDON WINNER, AUTONO-
MOUS TECHNOLOGY (1976); and LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR
(1984).
44. See JOHN BOWKER, THE MEANINGS OF DEATH 3-5 (1991) (discussing the "Cryonics
Society of California").
45. In Greek myth, Tithonus wished for immortality, but not for youth, and eventually
withered into the shape of a grasshopper. See EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 428 (1942).
46. See, e.g., Stephen S. Hall, Racing Toward Immortality.- The Recycled Generation, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000 (Magazine), at 30; Brian Alexander, Don't Die, Stay Pretty, WIRED, Jan.
2000, at 178-87.
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organ transplant.47 Nevertheless, limited organ availability, immune
system incompatibilities, and technological limits on the chemical
synthesis or simulation of tissues seemed insuperable difficulties to
the "organ replacement" project.
Recent stem-cell research has led scientists to predict the
manufacturing of a "cell so protean and potent that it could theoreti-
cally generate an infinite supply of replaceable body parts-organ
and skin, sinew and bone, blood and brain-to knit the tatters of
disease, injury or old age."" Not only organ regeneration but also
synthetic manufacture of human tissues have led many to speculate
about indefinite prolongation of life.49 These projects are not mere
science-fiction fantasies: patents and licensing agreements are al-
ready in place for each.s°
B. Genetic Replication via Cloning
Cloning has raised similar, if less widely shared, enthusiasm.
Brigitte Bosselier, a leader of a pro-cloning cult (the "Raelians"), has
spoken of cloning as a gift from God. She sees the procedure as a
chance at self-perpetuation that would realize here and now the
world religions' promises of eternal life." Her chiliastic group has
even recruited dozens of women to gestate potential clones. 2 Griev-
ing persons with perished relatives have approached the Raelians
and cloning scientists in order to "regenerate" lost kin.
47. Furthermore, "in the next three decades, medical science will move beyond the
practice of transplantation and into the era of fabrication. The idea is to make organs, rather
than simply to move them." Robert Langer & Joseph Vacanti, Artificial Organs, So. AM.,
Sept. 1995, reprinted in REVOLUTIONS IN SCIENCE: 13 CLASSIC ARTICLES FROM SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN 56 (1999). Langer and Vacanti conclude that "[ulltimately, tissue engineering will
produce complex body parts such as hand and arms. The structure of these parts can already
be duplicated in polymer scaffolding, and most of the relevant tissue types-muscle, bone,
cartilage, tendon, ligaments, and skin-grow readily in culture." Id.
48. Hall, supra note 46, at 31.
49. As Michio Kaku has written, "from now to 2020, perhaps the best bet in terms of
delaying or maybe reversing some of the diseases or symptoms of aging will be carefully
monitored hormone treatments .... After 2020... when we have personalized DNA
sequencing, an entirely new avenue will open up-i.e., identifying the fabled 'age genes,' if in
fact they do exist [and shutting off their instructions to the body to age].... From 2020 to 2050,
yet another promising approach will open up: growing new organs. Already, skin and other
tissues can be grown in the laboratory, and plans exist to grow entire organs, including kidneys,
hearts, and even possibly hands." MICHiO KAKU, To Live Forever?, in VISIONS: How
SCIENCE WILL REVOLUTIONIZE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 202 (1997).
50. See Hall, supra note 46, at 32. Hall speculates that "you might one day donate a
snippet of your own skin, allowing scientists to harvest stem cells that theoretically would
become a self-generated and limitless supply of transplant tissue-tissue that would make a
perfect immunological match." Id.
51. See Talbot, supra note 8, at 41 (quoting the founder of the Raelian sect, who claims
that "technology is not only technology but an extension of our spiritual life").
52. Id
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Their goal may strike many as bizarre. A person cannot be re-
duced to his body, much less to the genetic code that shaped its
development. The latter is all that is replicated when someone is
cloned. But as genetic explanations of human behavior gain popular-
ity and predictive power,53 perhaps we should not be surprised at
increasing popular identification of the self with the body's basic
building blocks. 4 Since "the genes we pass on to the next genera-
tion... may survive indefinitely into the future.., we know that
genes are in a sense 'immortal,"' bioethicist John Harris writes.5
Harris's formulation suggests how medical technology can displace
old desires for a divine afterlife. If genes are scientifically verified
vehicles for immortality, a person might evade death by identifying
with his genes. 6
C Deathless Vehicles for the Mind
Mechanical organs and artificial intelligence offer another avenue
to "negative immortality." Synthetic tissues may supplant stem cells
with inorganic organs that replicate the inputs and outputs of the
organs they replace. For example, an artificial pancreas might regu-
late insulin levels from within the body. Artificial intelligence offers
even more exotic modes of self-preservation. Some scientists believe
that they may find technical methods of "translating" the activities of
the brain into some more durable medium. After soul has been
reduced to self, self to mind, and mind to brain, this last step of
understanding what the brain is as what it does appears plausible to
many. Consciousness, on this view, is software, a program that can
53. See JOHN HORGAN, THE UNDISCOVERED MIND: How THE HUMAN BRAIN DEFIES
REPLICATION, MEDICATION, AND EXPLANATION 137-67 (1999) (describing expansive claims
by behavioral geneticists who claim to have discovered genes responsible for alcoholism,
criminality, and other traits); see also Evelyn Fox Keller, Master Molecules, in ARE GENES
US? THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW GENETICS 95 (Carl F. Cranor ed., 1994)
(analyzing scientific rhetoric that has "done so much to support the rise of confidence in
genetic determinism within popular culture").
54. See, e.g., EVELYN Fox KELLER, REFIGURING LIFE (1998). Keller argues that "we now
have different ways of talking of the body (for example as a computer, an information-process
network, or a multiple input-multiple output transducer) [and] because of the advance of the
modem computer (and other new technologies), we now have dramatically new ways of
experiencing and interacting with that body." Id. at 18.
55. JOHN HARRIS, CLONES, GENES, AND IMMORTALITY: ETHICS AND THE GENETIC
REVOLUTION 7 (1998).
56. Rather like the man who, having lost his keys while walking down a dark street, looks
for them only under lampposts because that is the only place he can see.
57. As Iris Murdoch comments, such is the influence of the modem scientific world view
that common discourse now reflects the materialist view "that reality is finally a quantity of
material atoms and that significant discourse must relate itself directly or indirectly to reality
so conceived." IRIS MURDOCH, EXISTENTIALISTS AND MYSTICS 287 (1996). See also EDWARD
S. REED, FROM SOUL TO MIND: THE EMERGENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY (1994). There is an
intimate connection between reductionism, materialism, and behaviorism. See DANIEL N.
2002]
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 14:73
be run on any hardware as intricate as a human brain." In theory, a
silicon-and-wire computer could preserve someone's consciousness
by running "their" program."
III. POSITIVE IMMORTALITY
Dead, you are no longer around.., and if there is nowhere else
you'll be (heaven, hell, with the white light) then all that will be
left of you is your effects, leavings, traces. People do seem to
think it important to continue to be around somehow.... A sig-
nificant life is, in some sense, permanent.... [I]t leaves traces.
- Robert Nozick, PhilosophicalExplanationdO
Writing two millennia ago, the Latin poet Horace prophesied for
himself (a kind of) immortality. At the conclusion of three volumes
of stylized meditations on civilization and nature, he closed his mag-
num opus with braggadocio. Abandoning Roman norms of defer-
ence, he predicted that his work would outlast the monuments of his
patrons: "Exegi monumentum aere perennius."' The prediction has
come true-Horace has found immortality (at least in classics de-
partments).
Like Horace (albeit usually in humbler ways), persons in countless
ages and places have responded to their own finitude by identifying
with timeless roles, goals, and institutions. In the West, these cultural
responses to death can be usefully classified into two camps: religious
and secular humanism. Since the Enlightenment, these humanisms
have developed widely divergent views on mortality. Secular human-
ists have often characterized theistic beliefs in an afterlife as self-
delusion or distraction. But the inarticulacy of their own attitudes
toward death threatens to undermine the very ideals they seek to ad-
vance. The common ontological ground of secular humanist and
religious thought on immortality only comes into focus with the ad-
ROBINSON, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY (1993).
58. See HORGAN, supra note 53, at 201 ("According to the strong artificial intelligence
program there is no fundamental difference between computers and brains: a computer is
different machinery than a person in terms of speed and memory capacity.").
59. RAYMOND KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES 65 (1999).
60. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 582 (1984).
61. Roughly translated, "I have built a monument more lasting than bronze." HORACE,
ODES, 111.30. Horace's hopes are echoed in countless writers. As Faulkner has claimed, "[The
writer] knows he has a short life span. The day will come that he must pass through the wall of
oblivion and he wants to leave a scratch on the wall-Kilroy was here-that someone a
hundred or a thousand years later will see." ROBERT JAY LIFTON, The Future of Immortality,
in THE FUTURE OF IMMORTALITY AND OTHER ESSAYS FOR A NUCLEAR AGE 12 (1987)
(quoting WILLIAM FAULKNER, FAULKNER IN THE UNIVERSITY (1959)).
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vent of scientific efforts to do away with death altogether.62 These
scientific efforts can, in turn, only be understood in the context of
historical human yearnings for immortality.
A. Religious and Secular Humanism
Devout Christians, Jews, and Muslims have understood earthly life
as a prelude to the next.63 The children of God are counseled to be
in, but not of the world. The exile of the Israelites in the Hebrew
Bible mirrors man's status as a sojourner on earth.' St. Francis of
Assisi counseled Christians to pray that the constellation of para-
doxes that is Christian belief would culminate in miraculous trans-
formation at death:
For it is in giving that we receive,
in forgiving, that we are forgiven,
and in dying that we are born to eternal life.65
While mourned in Christian ritual, death is celebrated in its dogma
and prayers as a passageway to a better life. Similarly, in Islam, "life
is a gift from Allah and when the Appointed Time comes, the
individual departs from this World bound for a rendezvous with his
Maker in the hereafter."' For all of the "Abrahamic traditions," the
afterlife is a central article of faith.
Modern secular ideologies began as a reaction against these
religious traditions. They sought to elevate the human by discredit-
ing the supernatural. Particularly galling to many progressives was
the way in which otherworldly aspirations could distract the afflicted
62. As Hegel observed, the owl of Minerva flies at dusk. In other words, we are only
capable of defining what man is when we are faced with the "death of man" (in Foucault's
terms) or "abolition of man" (in C.S. Lewis's). See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF
THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 385-87 (1970); C.S. LEWIS, THE ABO-
LITION OF MAN 68 (1943) (arguing that "all possible future generations [may be the] patients
or subjects of a power wielded by those already alive... [by] means of selective breeding").
63. It might be more appropriate for me to discuss all world religions here, since "the
belief in a reembodiment of the dead is still officially obligatory for all Zoroastrians, Jews,
Muslims, Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists." Sulayman S. Nyang, The Teaching of the Ouran
Concerning Life after Death, in DEATH AND IMMORTALITY IN THE RELIGIONS OF THE
WORLD 71 (Paul Badham & Linda Badham eds., 1987) (quoting Arnold Toynbee, Intro-
duction to ARNOLD TOYNBEE & ARTHUR KOESTLER, LIFE AFTER DEATH 29 (1976)). I am
only discussing these three "peoples of the book" because the nature of the afterlife in other
world religions is quite different from the conception common to the "Abrahamic traditions."
64. Daniel Cohn-Sherbok, Death and Immortality in the Jewish Tradition, in DEATH AND
IMMORTALITY IN THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD, supra note 63, at 24.
65. ADRIAN HOUSE, FRANCIS OF ASSISi: A REVOLUTIONARY LIFE (2000) (quoting St.
Francis of Assisi's Prayer of St. Francis of Assisj); see also G.K. CHESTERTON, ST. FRANCIS OF
ASSISI (1924).
66. Sulayman S. Nyang, The Teaching of the Ouran Concerning Life After Death, in
DEATH AND IMMORTALITY IN THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD, supra note 63, at 73. Nyang
notes that the term al-akirah (the hereafter) appears 113 times in the Quran. Id.
2002]
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 14:73
from fighting for a better lot here on earth." Carrying on the Enlight-
enment's attack on traditional conceptions of immortality, Brecht
insisted that "you die like animals / and nothing comes after."' By
characterizing their worldly aims as "all there is," artists, writers, and
revolutionaries sought to invest them with something like the reli-
gious devotion once directed to the divine.
The secular reaction against religious authority led to some ob-
vious mischaracterizations of religious aims. Few religious leaders
were entirely focused on the eternal. Most premised its achievement
on the conformance of one's life on earth to a set of timeless stan-
dards deemed entirely consonant with human flourishing. Presently,
nearly all Christian denominations and Jewish and Muslim
movements complement the imperative of personal rectitude with an
obligation to improve society at large.
Nevertheless, the struggle between believers and their "cultured
despisers" over the significance of death has transformed the West.
After losing his faith, Ludwig Feuerbach announced that "the pur-
pose of my writings.., is to turn men from theologians into anthro-
pologists, from theophilists to philanthropists... from religious and
political lackeys of the heavenly and earthly monarchy into free, self-
confident citizens of the world."69 Feuerbach's secular sensibility
permeates much of the West.' Enlightenment rationalism now
dominates high culture, while demotic skepticism undermines the
initiatives of the pious. Theologians are embarrassed to be "raising
the question of eternal life at a time when a completely new scientific
world vision has come to prevail.., and there is no longer any
eternal truth that can evade the critical judgment of reason by an ap-
peal merely to the authority of Bible, tradition, or Church."7 The
procedural generation of norms through the market and democracy
67. Max Weber explores this possibility systematically in his discussion of compensational
theodicy (which rationalizes the plight of the poor to the poor by assuring them that their
misery will in some way earn them a joyful afterlife) and legitimational theodicy (which
rationalizes the privilege of the powerful as a reflection of God's intention for the world). See
generaily MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., 1953)
(1913).
68. HANS KUNG, ETERNAL LiFE? LIFE AFTER DEATH AS A MEDICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL,
AND THEOLOGICAL PROBLEM 23 (1982) (quoting BRECHT, Against Seduction, in HOMILIES
FOR THE HOME); see also FRIEDRICH NIETzSCHE, on the Other- Worldly and On the Virtue
that Makes Small, in THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 114, 187 (R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1969)
(1883).
69. KUNG, supra note 68, at 29 (quoting LUDWIG FEUERBACH, THE ESSENCE OF
CHRISTIANITY 12 (George Eliot trans., 1957) (1841).
70. Feuerbach's views and influence are also lucidly explained in Ninian Smart's discussion
of atheism and agnosticism. NINIAN SMART, THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF MANKIND 557
(3d ed., 1984) (observing that "in the modem period... powerful restatements of atheism and
agnosticism have had wide success); see also ROBERT COLES, THE SECULAR MIND (2000).
71. KUNG, supra note 68, at 6.
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has swept away substantive traditions and "superstition." Both have
cleared room for new ideals to inform the self-images of the age.
Intellectual historians have well-chronicled the displacement of
religious humanism by secular thought. Central to the story are the
following closely linked ideas:
1) that for us, life, flourishing, and driving back frontiers of
death and suffering are of supreme value; 2) that this wasn't
always so; it wasn't so for our ancestors, or for people in earlier
civilizations; 3) that one of the things that stopped it from being
so in the past is precisely a sense, inculcated by religion, that
there were higher goals; and that we have arrived at 1) by a
critique and overcoming of (this kind of) religion."
Charles Taylor styles this "metaphysical primacy of life" in the new
humanism as a revolution in our "moral sources," the basic ideas
that motivate human action and aspiration. Like most revolutions, it
has tried to root out the old regime.
But the secular humanist reaction against theistic belief in an
"afterlife" may be self-defeating. For while the intellectual conflict
between theism and secular humanism has dominated contemporary
Western thought on death, it does not exhaust our cultural responses
to mortality. Persons may also approach death with an anti-humanist
or post-humanist mentality. New efforts to "conquer death" through
science-either through the artificial intelligence or biotechnology-
constitute a radical challenge to both religious and secular humanist
responses to death.73 They threaten to render the universal ethical
standards of religious and secular humanisms secondary to the indi-
vidual pursuit of indefinite survival.
Many progressives scoff at the "immortality project" as one more
distraction from an ethical life, one more lure to the selfish concern
for self-preservation they see at the root of religious concerns for an
afterlife. Nevertheless, they are also challenged to give a fuller
account of the positive immortality that renders scientific efforts to
extend one's own life less urgent than the leading of a good one.
Despite secularists' expressed disdain for the very idea of eternal life,
they tend to offer "reassurances that compensate for those lost with
the death of God."' Chief among these "reassurances" is the idea
72. Charles Taylor, A Catholic Modernity?, in A CATHOLIC MODERNITY? 24 (James Heft
ed., 2000).
73. See Jedediah Purdy, The God of the Digerat, AM. PROSPECT, Mar./Apr. 1998, at 34-
40, available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V9/37/purdy-j.html. As Purdy notes, the biotech-
nological avant-garde is happy to permit "the strongest individuals... [to] create new myths
[and] remake themselves [with] expensive biological and electronic advances that promise
people the capacity to tinker with themselves in unprecedented ways." Id.
74. Idat 16.
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that, by identifying with a certain role, goal, or conception of the
good, one has identified the self with something that will outlast it.
Timelessness remains an indispensable feature of normativity.
On Benedict Anderson's account of nationalism, the rise of the
"imagined community" of the nation-state was possible only because
similar structures of collective consciousness had already been
inculcated by Western Christendom.75 Where the latter promised im-
mortality to persons, the former was premised on the greatness and
permanence of a people. Similarly, the "affirmation of ordinary life"
in early Protestantism became the basis for the modern renewal of
familism-a sense of achieving immortality through one's descen-
dants.76 By promising self-understanding in the face of the body's
inevitable decomposition, the ethical ideals of secular humanists
from Voltaire to Dawkins mirror religious economies of salvation."
By doing the right, by recognizing "reality," one can integrate one's
own life into a fabric of significance greater than the self.
B. Socially Recognized Versus Scientifically Verified Survival
Admittedly, one cannot attribute to all humanist ideologies similar
structures of motivation regarding ultimate concerns. Anarchists and
hedonists do not obviously mirror religious modes of thought. But
such secular philosophies, like others less individualistic in tone,
nevertheless share the ontological presuppositions of the world
religions: a community of humans all facing death. For all of them,
75. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1994).
76. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY
(1994). Taylor uses "ordinary life" as a term of art to
designate those aspects of human life concerned with production and reproduction, that
is, labor, the making of the things needed for life, and our life as sexual beings, including
marriage and the family. When Aristotle spoke of the ends of political association being
"life and the good life" (zen kai euzen), this was the range of things he wanted to
encompass in the first of these terms; basically they englobe what we need to do to
continue and renew life.
Id. at 211. To Aristotle, the good life included "delibera[tion] about moral excellence ... [and]
contemp[lation of] the order of things." Id To later churchmen, the highest station in society
was the religious life. These "influential ideas of ethical hierarchy exalted the lives of
contemplation and participation." Id. But the rise of bourgeois power led to a transvaluation of
values, whereby the economy and family became objects of devotion worthier than the state
and the church. As in early Biblical times, descendants (and devised property) became a
concrete token of one's immortality. Children and wealth supplanted glory and holiness as a
means-but the end remained the same.
77. As Alan Harrington has observed, "The voices of Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and
atheism join as one. Massed units in Red Square as well as Vatican City combine their energies
in a single mighty appeal: Save Us. For the beauty and cruelty in the world, the kindness and
the murder; our art trying to illuminate this wilderness; speculations of philosophers; and the
descent into drugs and drunkenness.., all are organized around death, and designed to
protect each of us from annihilation here or elsewhere." ALAN HARRINGTON, THE IMMOR-
TALIST 10 (1969).
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"foreknowledge of death... encourage[s] a human being to establish
priorities in life.""s Simply because doctors had neither the tools nor
the credibility to promise negative immortality before the present, all
humanisms predating our time had to assume their addressees would
die. Death was an essential feature of the horizons of significance
shared by all serious thinkers. Therefore humanists, be they secular
or religious, aspired to articulate a vision of "positive immortality": a
standard of ethics or achievement against which a person's life could
be judged timeless.
Perhaps positive immortality arose only as a sublimated hope for
an everlasting body. But its varied manifestations have persisted
because the dream of endless this-worldly embodiment has been
presumed to be impossible. Individuals pursue positive immortality
with words and deeds because (a) they recognize a past and admire
those of its figures who have made lasting contributions to society,
and (b) they could reasonably assume a future whose inhabitants (or
another world whose God) could similarly approve them. As nega-
tive immortality becomes a more plausible dimension of the future,
the reasoning in (b) becomes less and less convincing. Individuals are
left with a stark choice: to identify with the roles bequeathed by the
past (be they writers, businessmen, religious devotees, philanthro-
pists, or whatever), or to strive for a status that renders the past
trivial with its promise of indefinite extension of life into the future.
Positive immortality is premised on a common human history,
some faith that the assembled beliefs and testimonies of the past
speak to a self who can in turn testify to the future. As Henri Pirenne
argues,
All historical.., narrative.., rests upon a postulate: that of the
eternal identity of human nature. One cannot comprehend
men's actions at all unless one assumes that their physical and
moral beings have been at all times what they are today. Past
societies would remain unintelligible to us if the natural needs
they experienced and the psychical forces which stimulated
them were qualitatively different than our own.79
78. WILLIAM CONNOLLY, IDENTITYIDtFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF
POLITICAL PARADOX 17 (1993). Connolly acknowledges his debt to Heidegger, who offers
seminal explorations of the place of death in human consciousness. See Ethan J. Leib,
Authentic Falling: Heidegger's Paradox?, 4 SYMPOSIUM: J. CAN. SOC'Y FOR HERMENEUTICS
& POSTMODERN THOUGHT 71, 88 nn.28 & 29 (2000) (arguing that, for Heidegger, a person's
(Dasein's) being "thrown into the possibility of [her] own death... supports all other
possibilities of Dasein because Dasein's death in each case must be [her] own.... Being-
thrown-towards-death is the primary way that Dasein has the possibility for individuation
because death is in each case Dasein's own").
79. Henri Pirenne, What Are Historians Trying to Do?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
IN OUR TIME 232 (Hans Meyerhoff ed., 1959).
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Pirenne's account of the presuppositions of our understanding of the
past also applies to the future's understanding of us. We fear that a
future human race of ubermenschen simply would not be able to
understand life as we experienced it. That particular variety of non-
being (or non-influence) creates in us the same anxieties we imagine
in constitution writers (when we deviate from the "original intent")
or judges (when we overrule precedential authority). The moral
force of tradition results from our reluctance to compromise the
significance of our forbears' legacy unnecessarily. We hope for the
same regard from our progeny, even as we fear that "children
picking up our bones.., least will guess that with our bones / we left
much more, left what still is / the look of things, left what we felt /
And what we saw."' Technology that renders their experience
qualitatively different from our own alienates us from the future, and
renders trivial our efforts to build a better one.
Concededly, the same could be said in a formal sense about nearly
all technology. The printing press, the car, birth control, all changed
lives so dramatically that it might be hard for those living after them
to understand how their predecessors ever did without. But that
sense of distance from the past is itself rooted in a presumed
commonality of physical response. We can try to imagine what it
would be like if we lacked some technology, and put ourselves in the
place of those who came before it. By contrast, mortality from the
perspective of immortality is as unimaginable as drunkenness is to
someone who has always been sober. Olaf Stapledon suggested that
"beneficiaries" of negative immortality might "refresh their spirits
with a 'Cult of Evanescence,' a form of religious or artistic creation
in which the tragedy and beauty of short-lived creatures is given the
highest value... [which] connect[s] a computerized and intel-
lectualized species with the ancient realities of life and death.""l But
what catharsis would result from such tragedy? What identification
with the past would be possible? As Cynthia Ozick suggests, in such
a future, "sight and insight, inner and outer, sweet and salt, are
shuffled... all is ephemeral. There is no long and no short; there is
only immeasurable isness. ' 2 The indefinite future negative immor-
tality promises would erase the past from any horizon of significance.
80. WALLACE STEVENS, A Postcard from the Volcano, in POEMS OF WALLACE STEVENS
71 (1965).
81. FREEMAN DYSON, IMAGINED WORLDS 160 (1997). Dyson here refers to an episode in
Stapledon's futuristic novel, Last and First Men. In Stapledon's vision, a "future race" will be
divided among those who "insist[] that the formal beauty of the universe demand[s] the tragic
evanescence of all things, and those who [are] determined to show that living minds could
actually reach back into past events in all their pastness." OLAF STAPLEDON, LAST AND FIRST
MEN 237 (Dover Pub. 1976) (1930).
82. CYNTHIA OZICK, THE PUTrERMESSER PAPERS 234 (1997).
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The conflict between positive and negative immortality does not
simply exist at a conceptual level, but is evident in our culture. Like
the corporations that employ, feed, and clothe most of us who are
affluent enough to be offered visions of the new immortality, we
increasingly seek unlimited life instead of the kinds of achievements
that would make a limited life good or memorable. If we follow
Phillip Rieff and define culture as a set of common understandings
"consecrat[ing]" those "purposes alone in which the self can be real-
ized and satisfied,"83 we might term negative immortality a "symp-
tom" of our culture, a sign of illness or imminent transformation. '
Older aims pale in comparison with its promise of invulnerability.
IV. EVALUATING NEGATIVE IMMORTALITY
... Strip something
of its mortality, and how do you know
what's left to see?
-Mark Doty, Lament-Heaved5
The promise of immortality-be it from priest or scientist-always
deserves skepticism. Its offeror makes the grandest claim-not
merely to provide one particularly valued experience, but to grant
the opportunity to have them all. Heretofore those making such a
grand promise-those offering positive immortality -have had to
condition its achievement on a great sacrifice: the loss of one's
earthly existence. But now scientists are beginning to promise im-
mortality in exchange for cash. How should we respond?
There are many different ways to evaluate negative immortality.
Pragmatically, we might ask: does it work? As the discussion below
indicates, current results are mixed. Deep technical problems plague
even the most promising technologies of negative immortality.
Nevertheless, a few decades ago authorities announced insuperable
technical barriers to mapping the human genome and cloning
mammals. Craig Venter and Ian Wilmut have proven those predic-
tions wrong; technologies once deemed the province of science fic-
tion are rendered feasible.' Furthermore, a combination of genetic,
83. PHILLIP RIEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC 4 (1963).
84. I borrow the metaphor "symptom of culture" from Marjorie Garber's book of the
same name. MARJORIE GARBER, SYMPTOMS OF CULTURE 5 (1998) (explaining that "[desire]
cries out in its symptom... [S]ymptoms, then are ways of speaking. And the analysis of
symptoms is a reading practice.").
85. MARK DOTY, Lament-Heaven, in MY ALEXANDRIA 85 (1996).
86. See GINA KOLATA, CLONE: THE ROAD TO DOLLY AND THE PATH AHEAD 22-47
(1.998) (discussing Wilmut's cloning of a sheep).
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organ-replacement, and artificial-intelligence technologies might
achieve what no particular one of them can do alone.
In any event, technological forecasting matters less to a discussion
of the feasibility of negative immortality than does an awareness of
the deeply value-laden quality of this supposedly "scientific" deter-
mination. Despite the efforts of Alan Turing and others to develop a
"test" for determining when life is artificially generated," debates
continue as to the meaning of such tests. If individuals begin to
identify with those aspects of themselves most tractable to
preservation, they will ensure the success of new technologies of
negative immortality. That incipient process raises another question:
should individuals strive for the kind of self-preservation promised
by negative immortality?
Critics of the "immortality project" have focused on the
unintended consequences of regenerative medicine. After analyzing
the critics' arguments and appeals, I complement them with my own.
I shall try to make the "unintended consequences" critique more
immediate by examining the unexpectedly negative impact of a more
proximate innovation: the precise manipulation of moods via drugs.
Next, I render more relevant the projected dystopias of some of the
new medicine's critics by examining how its present distribution
expresses the same normative commitments-to human inequality
and moral irresponsibility-so memorably condemned in works such
as Brave New World
A. Is Indefinite Self-Preservation Possible?
Philosopher Bernard Williams has argued that one would only opt
for negative immortality on two conditions: "that it should clearly be
me who lives forever... [and] that the state in which I survive
should be one which, to me looking forward, will be adequately
related, in the life it presents, to those aims which I now have in
wanting to survive at all." Bracketing the technological questions,
Williams provides several grounds for believing that indefinite life
cannot satisfy the second condition." But once we face the concep-
87. Alan M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433 (1950), reprint-
edin THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 40-67 (Margaret A. Boden ed., 1992).
A computer would "pass" the Turing Test if it could fool an interlocutor into believing that it is
human. Id.
88. BERNARD WILLIAMS, The Makropolous Case, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF: PHILO-
SOPHICAL PAPERS 1956-1972, at 82 (1973).
89. Williams doubts that a negatively immortal man can bring a "later character and its
desires into a relation to his present ones." Id. He further charges that boredom "would be not
just a tiresome effect, but a reaction almost perceptual in character to the poverty of one's
relation to the environment." Id. These conclusions suggest that the classic grounds for
skepticism about heaven-infinite boredom or the incomprehensibility of life "after life"-
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tual assumptions of those advocating each of the paths to indefinite
self-preservation mentioned above-cloning, organ replacement, and
artificial intelligence-the first condition also appears unattainable.
Consider human cloning; this technology of negative immortality
has raised the most public concern, but is also the most frequently
misconceived.' Many advocates of cloning envision it as a method
for individuals or couples unable to reproduce "naturally" to give
birth to genetically related offspring. However, its most celebrated
advocates are fringe groups that see it as a route to immortality-or
at least a partial evasion of death. Brigitte Bosselier has promoted
the procedure as a chance to resurrect loved ones.91 She included this
excerpt from a parent desperate to clone DNA preserved from his
dead child's body:
I couldn't accept that it was over for our child .... I would never
stop until I could give his DNA-his genetic make-up-a
chance. I knew that we only had one chance; human cloning. To
create a healthy duplicate, a twin of our son.'
According to Boisselier, hundreds of other parents have approached
her with similar requests.
It is difficult to respond fairly to individuals who believe that they
would resurrect a family member when they clone his or her DNA.
Though only a molecule, DNA has taken on sacred importance to
many:
Just as the Christian soul has provided an archetypal concept
through which to understand the person and the continuity of
the self, so DNA appears in popular culture as a soul-like entity,
a holy and immortal relic, a forbidden territory.... DNA has
taken on the social and cultural functions of the soul. It is the
essential entity-the location of the true self-in the narratives
of biological determinism.93
might be turned against advocates of negative immortality. In this regard, consider Wallace
Stevens: "Death is the mother of beauty; hence from her, / Alone, shall come fulfillment to our
dreams / And our desires." WALLACE STEVENS, Sunday Morning, in THE EMPEROR OF ICE
CREAM AND OTHER POEMS 8 (Bob Blaisdell ed., 1999).
90. See, e.g., LORI ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE: ADVENTURES IN THE NEW WORLD OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 237-260 (1999) (describing the Raelians and aspiring cloning
entrepreneurs).
91. See Talbot, supra note 8, at 41.
92. Issues Raised by Human Cloning Research: Hearing Before the Research Subcom-
mittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Energy and Commerce Comm., 107th
Cong. 55 (2001) (statement of Brigitte Boisselier, Medical Director of Clonaid) (quoting an
anonymous father who had approached her organization in order to clone the DNA of his
deceased son).
93. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON 42-2 (1995).
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In light of the First Amendment's free exercise clause, such belief
might render suspect any Congressional regulation of the practice.
The Raelians' belief in resurrection via cloning is no less incredible,
considered in isolation, than, say, the Roman Catholic belief in the
transubstantiation of the host at Mass.9' But neither is it any more
scientifically verifiable.
Whereas cloning offers immortality to persons who identify totally
with their genes, naturally cultured and synthetically manufactured
organs promise an indefinite home for the brain. As medical re-
search in each field advances, the promise of regenerative therapies
has given new urgency to once-speculative philosophical questions.
If you could transplant your brain from your body to another, would
you be the same person?95 What if you continually replaced body
parts as you aged? These questions are now raised in the media as
ways of thinking through the challenges posed by the new
technologies.
Each case can illuminate our intuitions in some way-we can
certainly imagine that if Henry's brain is transplanted into Jack's
body, we're more likely to think that the "resulting person" is Henry
(with a different body) than Jack (with a different brain).' The
pattern of memory and desire we call "mind" is more important to
identity than the physical presence of the body. 7 But we also imagine
that this resulting person would likely sense things differently now
that he has a different body. So is the resulting person Henry with a
new body, or Jack with a new brain?
94. And yet viewing that belief in isolation is surely the quickest route to misunderstanding
the matter. Most religious accounts of miracles and resurrections are tied to larger narratives
about morality, obligation, grace, and virtue. The raising of Lazarus-which the aggrieved
father mentioned above quoted in his testimonial as religious justification for his cloning
efforts-comes in the midst of a narrative designed to get people to lead better lives, and to
sacrifice in doing so. While one may imagine the Church of the Clones eventually supplanting
the Church of Rome, it is hard to see how Judeo-Christian ideals of universal benevolence
could find a place in a movement so assiduously devoted to the perpetual propagation of one's
own genetic material.
95. Such hypothetical questions are a staple subject of contemporary philosophical
discussions of personal identity. See, e.g., BERNARD WILLIAMS, Personal Identity and Indivi-
duation, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1956-1972, supra note 88, at 1;
ANDREW BRENNAN, CONDITIONS OF IDENTITY 1-10 (1988); TERENCE PENELHUM, SURVIVAL
AND DISEMBODIED EXISTENCE (1970); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1986); and
PETER UNGER, IDENTITY, CONSCIOUSNESS AND VALUE (1990). Parfit argues that "X today is
one and the same person as Y at some past time if and only if [1] enough of Y's brain [to be the
brain of a living person] continued to exist, and is now X's brain, and [2] there does not exist a
different person who also has enough of Y's brain." Id. at 204.
96. See also id. at 245-80 (discussing analogous case of "Charles and Robert").
97. But even this assertion is contestable. Certainly on a day-to-day basis, the resulting
person may have an easier time convincing acquaintances that he is Jack. But close friends and
family would realize the difference rather quickly. That is, those who "really know" Jack
would know that the resulting person is not he. Such speculations indicate how quickly efforts
to define what identity is become debates over what identity ought to be.
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The skeptical gerontologist Paul Hayflick illuminates the risks in-
herent in the projects of immortality, warning that we might lose our
identity in the biological shuffle: "Given the possibility that you
could replace all your parts, including your brain, then you lose your
self-identity, your self-recognition. You lose who you are! You are
who you are because of your memory."8 An Augustinian might
object that our identity is wrapped up not merely in our memory, but
also in our intellect and will.9 But these seem even less tractable to
biological transfer than memory is. Even if a person ordered
replacements for all his or her other "parts," a brain replacement
would render this individual a new person."° Such immortality would
clearly fail the first prong of Nagel's test for desirable models of
immortality-namely, that the one choosing the model would remain
the same person. '
Lingering suspicions about the durability and transferability of
cerebral "wetware" have led many scientists and philosophers into
artificial-intelligence research in order to search for inorganic sub-
strates for the mind. Just as physics promises that we can analyze any
physical system down to its smallest, (sub)atomic parts, the artificial-
intelligence program is premised on a reduction of our beliefs and
dispositions into declarative sentences and software code.1"2 Donna
Haraway observes that "communications sciences and modern
biologies are constructed by a common move-the translation of the
world into a problem of coding, a search for a common language in
which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all
heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, invest-
98. Hall, supra note 46, at 31.
99. As Garry Wills explains, in Augustine's writings, "[t]he three aspects of memory-time
(anticipation of the future, present attention, and memory) have the dynamic found in the
soul's three faculties of will (toward action), intellect (of articulated reality), and memory
(establishing identity)." GARRY WILLS, SAINT AUGUSTINE 97 (1999).
100. This objection to the very imaginability of immortality dates back at least to William
James, who began a lecture on immortality by asking, "How can we believe in life hereafter
when Science has once for all attained to proving, beyond possibility of escape, that our inner
life is a function of that famous material, the so-called "gray matter" of our cerebral
convolutions? How can the function possibly persist after its organ has undergone decay?"
WILLIAM JAMES, HUMAN IMMORTALITY: TWO SUPPOSED OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE
(1897), available at http://www.hds.harvard.edu/library/ingersoll/1897lecture.html. James sub-
sequently defended the idea of a supernatural consciousness supervenient upon (or "transmis-
sively" caused) by the brain. Id.
101. SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET (1995).
But see HUBERT DREYFUS, WHAT COMPUTERS STILL CAN'T DO: A CRITIQUE OF ARTIFI-
CIAL REASON (1998).
102. For example, Bernard Williams believes that one would only opt for (negative)
immortality on two conditions "that it should clearly be me who lives forever... [and] that the
state in which I survive should be one which, to me looking forward, will be adequately related,
in the life it presents, to those aims which I now have in wanting to survive at all." WILLIAMS,
supra note 88, at 82.
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ment, and exchange."' 3 For example, if someone asked me "who are
you?" I might attempt to "code" myself into a series of sentences
about my past actions: I am the being who does x when y occurs.
Looking back at my past, we might be able to discern some
algorithms or decision mechanisms that emerge in my responses to
stimuli. Some computer scientists believe that, as soon as we acquire
enough computing resources, and enough surveillance to ensure that
we know everything about the past of the person who wishes to be
"downloaded," we can sufficiently model his personality in software.
But even if we assume massive advances in computing, would
"you" really be preserved if you could download your conscious-
ness-or at least your characteristic pattern of observed response
and mental processes-into a computer?' Just as the physicists'
dream of a unified scientific field, explicable solely with reference to
"elementary particles," has been mired in the multiplication of rival
theories, so too has the artificial-intelligence program been rendered
increasingly unrealistic by theoretical obstacles. 5 Although re-
103. DONNA HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NA-
TURE 164 (1991). As Mark Kingwell explicates this point, "[i]f everything were translatable
into, say, digital code-including the idiosyncratic clusters of genetic information we call
persons-then everything would be made disposable, not in the sense of being destined to be
thrown away, but in the sense of being available for any kind of redeployment.... [Such]
reductionism... reduces the number of meaningful ways we have to talk about the world. And
that makes the world a poorer place." Mark Kingwell, Wat Does It All Mean?, WILSON Q,
Fall 2002, available at http://wwics.si.edu/outreach/wq/WQSELECT/KINGWELL.HTM; see
also THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992); EVELYN Fox KELLER, REFIGURING
LIFE: METAPHORS OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY BIOLOGY (1996).
104. According to one of his critics,
Alan Turing, one of the founders of modem computation, was fascinated with how the
distinction between software and hardware illuminated immortality. Turing's friend
Christopher Morcom had died when they were teenagers. If Morcom's continued
existence depended on his particular embodiment, then he was gone for good. But if he
could be instantiated as a computer program (software), Morcom's particular
embodiment (hardware) would be largely irrelevant.
William A Dembski, Are We Spiintual MachinesZ FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1, 1999, at 25.
105. See BERNARD PULLMAN, THE ATOM IN THE HISTORY OF HUMAN THOUGHT (1998).
Pullman notes that "[t]he atomic theory provided a battleground for a clash of ideas spanning
twenty-five centuries of the history of human thought." Id. at ix. However, by the early
twentieth century, physicists began to feel that "whether we take electrons, light quanta,
benzol molecules, or stones, we shall always come up against these two characteristics, the
corpuscular and the undular" -that is, that there were no elementary particles, only ultimately
undiscoverable combinations of particles and waves, at the base of physical reality. Id. at 273.
Similarly, the strong Al program aspired to "atomize" human thought into the "software" of
descriptive code, but has run up on the shoals of the dynamic, "wavelike" character of human
thought. Like quantum physics, it also stumbles on the inextricable interrelationship of
observer and observed. For, as Searle argues, "The aim of natural science is to discover and
characterize features that are intrinsic to the natural world. By its own definitions of compu-
tation and cognition, there is no way that computational cognitive science could ever be a
natural science, because computation is not an intrinsic feature of the world. It is assigned
relative to observers." JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 212 (1999). In
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searchers have designed a computer that can beat the world's best
chess player, they are nowhere near consensus on what types of
algorithms a computer with humanistic, "all-purpose" intelligence
would need." The proposed translation of persons into words,
numbers, and algorithms, and the presumed fixation of those
formulae into a non-carbon-based robot, appears impossible-not
merely as a technical matter, but also in principle. Much of what
makes us who we are consists of spontaneity rooted in inarticulate
background assumptions, or tacit knowledge, about the world. 7
Since conversation and other basic human interaction involves "per-
formances where an explicit definition of the problem seems beyond
our capacity . . . [and] deploys skilled performances which are
themselves not explicitly thematized," the strategic modes of artifi-
cial-intelligence "thinking" can never properly mirror the communi-
cative nature of human interaction." Humans are receptive to the
world, altering their responses to it, and their rules for altering
responses, as a result of encounters with others."° We can thematize
dimensions of this "lifeworld," but we can never summarize it in one
other words, the idea of a general human intelligence depends upon the embodiment of that
intelligence in human form.
106. As Horgan describes it, the artificial-intelligence movement aims to "build[] a
computer with an all-purpose rather than highly specialized intelligence." HORGAN, supra
note 53, at 215.
107. As Jon Elster has observed, the command "be spontaneous" is oxymoronic. JON
ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (1983). Applying continental philosophy to the problem of
generating an "all-purpose intelligence" with the capability to set its own goals, John Horgan
notes that "Heidegger... argued that would be extremely difficult to reproduce human
perception and cognition with a formal, rule-based model.... [He] pointed out that rules
rarely apply to all situations; each rule requires extra rules to determine whether the initial rule
is relevant for the particular situation, thus creating an infinite regress of rules." HORGAN,
supra note 53, at 210.
108. CHARLES TAYLOR, Cognitive Psychology, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note
4, at 188. JIrgen Habermas explains the distinction between communicative and strategic
action as follows: "In communicative action a basis of mutually recognized validity claims is
presupposed; this is not the case in strategic action. In the communicative attitude it is possible
to reach a direct understanding oriented to validity claims; in the strategic attitude, by contrast,
only an indirect understanding via determinative indicators is possible." JURGEN HABERMAS,
COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY, 208 n.2 (1979).
109. In this sense the Gadamerian concept of the hermeneutical circle applies not just to
interpretation, but to all human action. As William Eskridge explains,
The dynamic process of interpretation works thus: Upon our first approach to the text,
we project our pre-understandings onto it. As we learn more about the text, we revise
our initial projections, better to conform with the presumed integrity of the text as it
unfolds to us. Essential to the interpreter's conversation with the text is her effort to find
a common ground that will both make sense out of the individual parts of a text and
integrate them into a coherent whole.
William Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609,627 (1990).
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fell swoop (as we would need to do in order to render it capable of
replication). " '
Another conceptual problem lies in the translation of experience,
sensation, and memory into electrical impulses. The body may be a
transducer, "1 but we are nowhere near to reducing each sensation
and thought to a binarized, digital file of positive and negative elec-
trical impulses. Some artificial intelligence researchers have respond-
ed to this problem with a behavioristic program; if persons are what
persons do, close observation of a person can result in a device that
perfectly mimics that person's responses to various situations.112 Al-
though some might call such a device a zombie or robot, its artificial-
intelligence backers respond that this is unthinking discrimination.
They argue that all verified communications of intelligence should
count as intelligence."3
One group of such programmers have styled themselves
"ontologizers"; they teach artificial-intelligence devices millions of
commonsense rules with the aim of eventually investing them with a
pattern of response indistinguishable from that of ordinary
humans." ' One such device, Cyc, "knows" that "trees are usually
outdoors, that once people die they stay dead, and that a glass filled
with milk will be right side up, not upside-down... 5 Cyc's inventors
hope that advances in computing will eventually allow them to map
out for it "human" responses to all conceivable situations. But its
programmers are nowhere near reducing to rules the practical reason
and constellation of tastes, sensations, and emotions that lead people
to the decisions, whether grave or trivial (from vocational choice to
tastes in music), that seem the hallmark of human agency.
Admittedly, we can no more define human agency scientifically
than we can demonstrate conclusively that machines have it.
Discussing how scientists evaluate the "humanity" of their artificial
110. Schutz and Luckmann define the "lifeworld" as "that province of reality which the
wide-awake and normal adult simply takes for granted in the attitude of common sense. [It is
the] unquestioned ground of everything given in my experience, and the unquestionable frame
in which all the problems I have to deal with are located." JURGEN HABERMAS, 1 THE
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 129-30 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987) (quoting A.
SCHUTZ & T. LUCKMANN, THE STRUCTURES OF THE LIFEWORLD 3-4 (1993)). Habermas
explains that "only the context directly spoken to on a given occasion can fall into the whirl of
problematization associated with communicative action; by contrast, the lifeworld always
remains in the background." Id. at 130.
111. See DIANE ACKERMAN, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE SENSES 308 (1993).
112. See STEVE GRAND, CREATION: LIFE AND HoW TO MAKE IT (2001).
113. See, e.g., Turing, supra note 87.
114. HORGAN, supra note 53, at 215; see also Clive Thompson, The Know-It-Al Machine:
An Audacious Quest to Teach a Computer Common Sense, LINGUA FRANCA, Sept. 2001, at
23; DREYFUS, supra note 101, at 10-30.
115. HORGAN, supra note 53, at 216.
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intelligence creations, Sherry Turkle observes that "what is involved
here is not a weighing of scientific theory but an appropriation of
images and metaphors.""6 As cognitive scientists "disseminate the
idea that machines may be able to think like people and that people
may have always thought like machines,' 7 the central philosophical
question raised so far by artificial intelligence-can machines think?
-becomes less important than the potential of artificial intelligence
to force us to articulate our reasons for valuing any feature of the
natural or built environment. Why, for example, do we now value
humans more than computers? If someone (believes he has)
preserved his consciousness on a machine, should the resulting
(simulacrum of the) person have (some of) the rights of its creator?"'
Taking up the challenge, Richard Posner observes that, eventually,
"there will be computers that have as many 'neurons' as [humans],
and the 'neurons' will be 'wired' similarly." In such a case, Posner
asks, should we be distressed at the thought of destroying a
"conscious" computer?" 9
Posner wisely grounds his own response in a widely held intuition:
"Most of us would think it downright offensive to give greater rights
to ... computers than to retarded people, upon a showing that...
the computer has a greater cognitive capacity to profoundly retarded
human being."'20 But this is not simply a visceral response or brute
affect; it is a signifying emotion, reflecting a deeper self-knowledge. 2'
No matter how highly we wish to value an artifact like a computer,
our scale of values itself is parasitic on our embodied form. We
sense, however inarticulately, that our centers of value cannot hold
once the human person, as embodied presently, ceases to be the
valuer. As Clifford Geertz has observed, man is a being "suspended
116. TURKLE, supra note 101, at 142.
117. Id.
118. Even these formulations are contestable empirically. Ask anyone with a broken
stereo whether he plans on spending, say, the $30 necessary to fix the device, as opposed to
spending $30 on providing food to a starving person, and they will likely go ahead and fix the
hardware. One would need to be a hard utilitarian to condemn that action, but it raises
questions about how closely our stated moral commitments match our lived experience.
119. Richard Posner, AnimalRights, 110 YALE L.J. 527, 531-32 (2001).
120. Id. at 532. But see Steven Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death: Computers, Con-
sciousness, and Nancy Cruzan, 43 STAN. L. REV. 659 (1991) (identifying "self-consciousness"
as the key criterion of human identity, and linking humans to computers via a Darwinian
framework); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 1231 (1992) (arguing that just as "Christopher Stone brought questions of environmental
ethics into focus by asking whether trees should have standing.., artificial intelligences'
[potential] invocation of the individual rights provisions of the United States Constitution"
poses fundamental questions for American law).
121. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS
22 (2001) (discussing signifying emotions as "forms of judgment").
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in webs of significance," largely of his own making.122 Far from being
one of many potential transducers,"2 the body qua body is the only
reliable vehicle for perceptions continuous with those we now ex-
perience.
B. Is Indefinite Self-Preservation Desirable ?
At present, there are serious obstacles to the attainment of any
particular vision of negative immortality. Each project seems to lack
something essential to human agency. Artificial-intelligence projects
are unconvincing because their products lack bodies, and therefore
cannot experience the sense-perceptions that are fundamental to
human consciousness. Given the inevitable decay and profound im-
portance of the brain, perpetual rounds of organ replacement seem
only to offer their beneficiaries a series of lives, and not really a
chance to maintain a coherent one. Neither the inorganic nor the
organic forms of immortality offered by these two families of
technologies offers indefinite life that is recognizably human or
continuous with that of the person who employs them.
However, it is by no means clear that a combination of such
technologies would inevitably fail at what each individually appears
incapable of accomplishing. As Diane Ackerman concludes her
Natural History of the Senses-
The body is a transducer (from Latin, to lead across, transfer), a
device to convert energy of one sort to energy of another, and
that is its genius. Our bodies take mechanical energy and
convert it to electrical energy.... The brain is silent, the brain is
dark, the brain tastes nothing, the brain hears nothing. All it
receives are electrical impulses-not the sumptuous chocolate
melting sweetly, not the oboe solo like the flight of a bird, not
the pastel pink and lavender sunset over the coral reef-only
impulses.12
If the pattern of such impulses could be systematically mapped,
advanced sensory interfaces would permit "human thinking [to]
merg[e] with the world of machine intelligence."" If such
transducers are developed, there will be "little difference between a
122. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1984) (arguing, along
with Max Weber, that "man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has
spun... [and taking] culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an
experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning").
123. See KELLER, supra note 54, at 18 (discussing scientific models of the human body as a
multiple-input/multiple-output transducer).
124. Id. at 308.
125. KURZWEIL, supra note 59, at 234.
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human who has upgraded her body and brain using new
nanotechnology... and a robot who has gained an intelligence and
sensuality surpassing her human creators."'26 Such cyborgs would
face no natural limit to their "lifespan."
These creatures are obviously a long way off in the future, if they
are possible at all. Nevertheless, they are useful objects to
contemplate, as medical science pledges to push back the frontiers of
death. What price would we pay for victory in the struggle?
1. Philosophical Perspectives
Immortality has been a continuous theme of the Western philo-
sophical tradition.'27 Normative reflection on the topic has animated
philosophy, fiction, and myth. In relating Odysseus's refusal of
Circe's offer of a blissful, deathless existence, Homer expresses pri-
mordial reservations about such "elevation:"
Mighty goddess, do not be angry with me for this. I know very
well myself that wise Penelope is less impressive to look upon
than you in looks and stature, for she is a mortal, while you are
immortal and ageless. But even so, I wish and long day in and
day out to reach my home, and to see the dog at my return. And
if again some god shall smite me on the wine-dark sea, I will
endure it, having in my breast a heart that endures affliction."
A cynic might respond that Odysseus has simply learned to want
what he has had to do; the refusal is nothing but a failure of the
imagination. But it is certainly more than that: the devotion to
Penelope is real. To leave her behind would be callous. And even if
we imagined an Odysseus with neither home nor wife, the strange,
Elysian immortality offered by Circe scarcely offers an option to a
person, but rather transforms that person, obliterating connection to
all that has gone before. A choice for immortality would elevate the
capacity for pursuing projects above the ability to make one's own
life a coherent story.
Yet, despite all these reasons, Circe's promise is still tempting, and
Odysseus's dilemma still real to us today. In justifying Odysseus's
126. Id. at 148.
127. See, e.g., MORTIMER ADLER, Immortality, in I THE GREAT IDEAS: A SYNTOPICON
OF THE GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 784-94 (Robert Maynard Hutchins, et al.
eds., 1952) (outlining topics such as the fear of death, arguments for and against personal
survival, the moral significance of immortality (as sanction or reward), and conceptions of the
afterlife). For more contemporary perspectives, see JOHN MARTIN FISCHER, Introduction:
Death, Metaphysics, and Morality, in THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH 3-30 (John Martin Fischer
ed., 1993).
128. HOMER, ODYSSEY, V.215-222 (A.T. Murray trans., 1919) (revised in 1995 by George
E. Dimock).
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response, Martha Nussbaum has explained that "Homeric heroes
imagine their appropriate goal to be not immortal life, but the
creation of a deathless record of excellence, of deeds or works
through which they do in a sense make the world as it will be ever
after." '129 Again, a skeptic might respond that negative immortality
would simply give a person a chance for more great acts. To this
Nussbaum argues that "it is only when one gives up on the aspiration
to external transcendence-realizing that one is not going to be
immortal-that one will begin to pursue (with good results for the
world) the other sort.' 30
Of course, the search for positive immortality does not always end
with "good results for the world." But Nussbaum suggests that it is
only our own suffering that make us sensitive to the suffering of
others. She has imaginatively vindicated traditions in Greek thought
that identify human vulnerability to suffering and death as not
merely challenges to, but also conditions of a genuinely moral life.'
Arguing that our "morality is a response to the fact of suffering,"
Nussbaum asserts that "the human world is held together by pity and
fellow-feeling.' 32 It is easy to imagine the negatively immortal
entirely unconcerned with the community, culture, family, and
history-rendered irrelevant by their godly estate. In Heraclitus's
words: "Immortals are mortal, mortals immortal, living with respect
to one another's death, dead with respect to one another's life. '' 3
We might conclude by extension that a sense of human community is
premised in part on a shared fate of death.
Leon Kass, chair of President Bush's Bioethics Advisory Commis-
sion, has also addressed the ways in which "our finitude [is] good for
US. ' 1 34 He suggests that negative immortality would result in a boring
dilettantism: "If the human life span were increased even by only
twenty years, would the pleasures of life increase proportionately?
Would professional tennis players really enjoy playing twenty-five
129. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND
LITERATURE 381 (1990).
130. Id. at 382.
131. In the Nicomachean Etics, Aristotle observes that a divine being would not be
capable of many human virtues because it would not experience the temptations that divert us
from virtue. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1178b10-16 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985).
Nussbaum observes that "important constituents of human eudaimonia cannot be found in a
life without shortage, risk, need, and limitation. Their nature and their goodness are consti-
tuted by the fragile nature of human life." MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOOD-
NESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 340 (1987).
132. NUSSBAUM, supra note 131, at 375.
133. Heraclitus fr. DK52 (quoted in NUSSBAUM, supra note 131, at 341).
134. Kass, supra note 26, at 22.
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percent more games of tennis?"'35 Kass insists that we are often only
prompted to seriousness, to commitment, by the sense that we may
be wasting our limited span of years. Reflecting on Wallace Stevens's
cryptic metaphor "Death is the mother of beauty,"'" Kass writes that
"only a mortal being, aware of his mortality and the transience and
vulnerability of all natural things, is moved to make beautiful
artifacts, objects that will last, objects whose order will be immune to
decay as their maker is not."'37 Kass concentrates on the way in
which a life gains meaning, and gives meaning to a goal, to the extent
that it is sacrificed on the goal's behalf. In his words, "To be mortal
means that it is possible to give one's life, not only in one moment,
say, on the field of battle, but also in the many other ways in which
we are able in action to rise above attachment to survival.'
'1 38
It is heartening to see a leading figure in public debate on medical
research address philosophically the ultimate issues it raises. Kass's
mix of aesthetic appeals and moral judgments is powerful. He
demonstrates that the acceptance of death is not simply a com-
placency of the other-worldly, those consoled with faith in an
afterlife designed to compensate for the loss of this one. Those
questioning the biotechnological goal of "death to death" are more
than a sectarian movement; they are an important voice for modera-
tion, for reflective consideration of the unintended consequences of
what may seem the most benevolent of projects. Reflections like
these could give negative immortality's enthusiasts serious grounds
for questioning their quest.
Nevertheless, Kass's and Nussbaum's arguments for mortality are
scarcely conclusive. They come from within a tradition that does not
command the allegiance of all within the multicultural west, much
less those outside it. The example of Odysseus and the words of
Aristotle and Stevens have much to recommend them, but one
cannot prove the goodness of mortality from them. Indeed, the very
comparison of the mortal with the immortal leads to paradoxes.
Consider this argument from Kass:
To argue that human life would be better without death is, I
submit, to argue that human life would be better being
something other than human. To be immortal would not be just
to continue life as we mortals now know it, only forever. The
new immortals, in the decisive sense, would not be like us at all.
If this is true, a human choice for bodily immortality would
135. Id. at 23.
136. STEVENS, supra note 89, at 32.
137. Kass, supra note 26, at 23.
138. Id. at 24.
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suffer from the deep confusion of choosing to have some great
good only on the condition of turning into someone else.
Moreover, such an immortal someone else, in my view, will be
less well off than we mortals are now, thanks indeed to our
mortality.'39
Kass's assertion that the immortal person would be "less well off
than we mortals are now" is undercut by his repeated arguments that
such a person would have a life totally unlike ours. Either the lives
involved are incommensurable or they are comparable. Given that
all our horizons of significance are circumscribed by death, the
former seems far more likely than the latter. And if that is indeed the
case, it seems incoherent to say that the immortal is less well off than
the mortal, for they cannot share a horizon of meaning within which
such comparisons make sense.
This is not to diminish the significance of Kass's and Nussbaum's
work. By appealing to archetypal myths and contemporary aspira-
tions, they raise fundamental questions about the project of negative
immortality. They convincingly demonstrate how death gives
meaning to life.' But they cannot prove the converse-the
meaninglessness of deathlessness-because it is impossible to thickly
describe immortality."' If we are suspicious of attempts to achieve it,
we should be less concerned with discrediting a situation no one has
experienced than with arguing why no one should want to achieve it.
Reflective critics of technology have often questioned whether
hailed innovations have improved or impaired our lot. The cellular
phone makes life more convenient-but also creates the pressure of
making oneself instantly available to work and family members.
Technology is only beneficial given a backdrop of shared normative
commitments. As we move from inventing artifacts to reinventing
ourselves, we risk engendering intimately devastating "revenge
effects" that upset delicately balanced patterns of cognition and
social interaction.'
4 2
By drawing analogies from the Midas-like technologies of the self
we have already achieved, we might better understand how the at-
tempt to eliminate death might be as disturbing-and ultimately self-
139. Id. at 22.
140. But see CALLAHAN, supra note 5, at 172-73 (relating similar perspectives on death
from Irving Singer, Hans Jonas, and George Santayana).
141. For a definition of thick description, see GEERTZ, supra note 122, at 12-20.
142. See EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW OF
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 6 (1997) ("Wherever we turn, we face the ironic unintended
consequences of mechanical, chemical, biological, and medical ingenuity- revenge effects,
they might be called.. . . [They are] the tendency of the world around us... to twist our clever-
ness against us.").
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defeating-as an attempt to eliminate other negative but necessary
dimensions of human experience. Advanced pharmaceuticals might
soon offer us a chance to eliminate altogether some of the most
negative aspects of human emotional existence, such as depression
and anxiety. Should we advance such research? I believe the answer
is "no," and that this response to the technological manipulation of
emotional states might ground a similar ethical perspective on tech-
nological manipulation of life span.
2. How Death is Like Psychological Pain: Lessons for the Evaluation
of Negative Immortality
Although anti-depressants like Prozac have relieved the suffering
of millions, the new psychopharmacology has raised ethical concerns.
Are those "cured" by the new drugs truly happy or is their good
mood merely a chemical substitute for genuine well-being? By
improving "mood" overall, the new drugs threaten to dampen not
only pathological, "free-floating" feelings of anxiety or sadness, but
also signifying emotions. A once guilt-ridden man may be freed from
irrational anxiety over his sinfulness or self-worth, but he may also
cease giving to charity, since he no longer feels guilty when he fails
to. Most of us would be glad to deal with his new, easy-going self, but
is that relief worth its cost?
Ethical dialogue on this question has so far focused on
authenticity-how the new drugs affect users' integrity, sincerity,
lucidity, and commitment. To critics like Carl Elliott (a medical
ethicist), using drugs to alleviate alienation may lead to self-betrayal,
since intuitions about the worth or worthlessness of forms of life
around us are constitutive of our identity.'43 However, Peter Kramer
counters that many drugs don't dispatch such intuitions, but only
relieve the negative affect they generate in those who hold them.'" In
other words, cosmetic psychopharmacology allows a person to
preserve his understandings of the world without bearing all the
emotional "baggage" that may once have attended them. David
DeGrazia further argues that authenticity is enhanced rather than
threatened by new technologies for manipulating emotional
response, since "part of the human endeavor is deciding and trying
to become who we want to be.""'4 5
143. Carl Elliot, Pursued by Happiness and Beaten Senseless: Prozac and the American
Dream, 30 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT no. 2, at 7-10 (2000).
144. PETER KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC (1993).
145. David DeGrazia, Prozac, Enhancement, and Self-Creation, 30 HASTINGS CTR.
REPORT no. 2, at 35 (2000).
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While these commentators address an important issue raised by
the new psychopharmacology, they miss a more fundamental one.
Although the virtues of authenticity are necessary to a life well-lived,
they are not sufficient. Authenticity can have any content-one can
be authentically rude or polite, generous or stingy. To the extent that
it has served as a useful term in contemporary bioethics, authenticity
has tacitly incorporated substantive moral ideals. We can only judge
new developments in psychopharmacology when we begin to
articulate these ideals.
"Articulacy" requires us to look beyond authenticity to the social
institutions that create opportunities for good life choices. Do
psychopharmacological interventions enable people to relate to their
families and friends better? To participate in their communities?
Ideally, we aim not merely to maximize our own pleasure, but to
lead a balanced life of self-fulfillment and obligation to work, family,
friends, and civil society. When psychopharmacology helps us con-
structively connect to these realms, it is to be applauded. To the
extent that it enables us to endure or ignore disconnection, it is
suspect.
Projects of negative immortality share the same problem as the
unconstrained emotion-creation contemplated by the most ambitious
advocates of psychopharmacology. In the name of fulfilling dreams,
they threaten to destroy the identity of the dreamer. Like Midas
turning his world to gold, the person who chooses constant drug-
induced happiness objectifies and cheapens his actual experience. He
jettisons the receptivity requisite for an "I-Thou" (as opposed to an
"I-It") perspective on reality.
Similarly, the person who pursues negative immortality (and there-
by eschews the projects of positive immortality that give meaning to
the lives of those around him) refuses to "play the game" of her
peers. She seeks transcendence in a manner that would render their
achievements moot. As Midas, Pandora, and Tithonus learned,
shortcuts to transcendence can come at great cost. Just as precision
manipulation of emotions through drugs would not guarantee
"happiness" but only introduce a radically new psychic economy of
desire and aversion, negative immortality would transform, and not
merely temporally extend, the self. Death, like sadness and anger, is
part of an array of socially constructed experiences and expectations
that make us what we are. Like the atomist ideologues Charles
Taylor critiques, advocates of negative immortality
fail to take account of the degree to which the free individual
with his own goals and aspirations ... is himself only possible
within a certain kind of civilization; that it took a long develop-
ment of certain institutions and practices, of the rule of law, of
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rules of equal respect, of habits of common deliberation, of
common association, of cultural self development, and so on, to
produce the modern individual; and that without these the very
sense of oneself as an individual in the modern meaning of the
term would atrophy.'46
This may seem to be an exotic or unrealistic concern, for how could
you or me or anyone else for that matter cease to think of ourselves
as individuals? But Taylor's ultimate concern is not with us, but with
future generations. As he demonstrates in Sources of the Self, the
experience of oneself as a distinct, authentic essence, as a chooser of
roles instead of an unreflective follower of them, is peculiarly
modern. It made little sense in medieval times when one's ascribed
identity as a peasant, priest, noble or warrior completely defined
one's worldview. And we can imagine this experience fading from
history again: not because of the dominance of institutional roles, but
because of their etiolation. The institutional background of choice of
modern identity-among, for instance, the roles of religious commit-
ment, community organizing, lifelong marital partnership-is
presently being overwhelmed by a tyranny of uncoordinated indivi-
dual choices.'47 If all these cultural, religious, familial, and economic
associations fade, there will be no sources of value other than the
momentary preferences of the sovereign individual.
Negative immortality makes that fading inevitable: for those who
pursue it, the old ideal of attuning to and transcending cultural roles
is replaced by a bare commitment to evade death. The sovereign
individual who "outlives" all cultural roles will be trapped in the
position of "utility maximizer," bereft of the horizon of choice that
made varieties of positive immortality substantive ideals. In Taylor's
helpful formulation, he will only be capable of a "weak evaluation"
of the desirability of the life options available to him, as opposed to
the "strong evaluation" that occurs when we evaluate the legitimacy
of our desires.'"
146. CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 4, at 209.
147. Although institutions may merely be "rule-making entities" according to
methodological individualists like Jon Elster, they nevertheless create the rules that structure
the roles I here mention. See JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 147
(1989) (defining an institution as a "rule-enforcing mechanism... [for] a well-defined group of
persons, by means of external, formal sancations [or rewards]"). All roles consist in a certain
set of rules governing what we should believe about our desires, feelings, and beliefs.
148. CHARLES TAYLOR, What is Human Agency?, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra
note 4, at 18.
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V. THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF REGENERATIVE THERAPIES
I have so far framed challenges to negative immortality as defenses
of the present human lifespan sub species aeternitate. A lifespan of
about "three score years and ten," I have suggested, is not a tragic
deprivation but a proper baseline, a natural part of life. We can rea-
son to this conclusion by analogy from the self-defeating nature of
cognate technologies, as I have tried to do, or from within certain
cultural traditions, as Kass and Nussbaum have done.
Yet while such arguments might lead us to reconsider the ultimate
goal of negative immortality, they are not terribly convincing with
respect to its incremental projects. Conservatives in the nineteenth
century might have questioned the development of antibiotics by
defending a life span of "three score." Such judgments are inherently
comparative, and few would object to a gradual creeping upward of
the average life span.
We appear to be on the horns of a dilemma. Negative immortality
may be grotesque, narcissistic, alien-and yet every small step
toward it appears wholly legitimate.' 9 Regenerative medicine will
undoubtedly stave off death for many. Who would deny a man with
a failing heart the stem-cell-derived tissues that could repair it?
Perhaps this question needs to be supplemented with another:
Can I make an unlimited claim on my fellow citizens to pay,
through their taxes and insurance premiums, whatever it takes
to keep me alive as long as I (not they) have decided I still have
good reason to live? Can I, for that matter, even make an
unlimited claim upon my own family? 5°
With these queries, medical ethicist Daniel Callahan challenged
those who advocate "extraordinary measures" whenever they might
extend the life of a sick person. The questions apply with even
greater force to the regenerative dream of guaranteeing a perpe-
tually youthful vigor. In the final analysis, projects of negative im-
mortality are objectionable less intrinsically than instrumentally -as
lures to a disengaged survivalism.
Consider the practice of cloning. Why go to such extraordinary
measures to assure that oneself, or someone whom one has already
loved dearly, is replicated genetically? Doesn't the world offer
enough other objects of love and concern? This is an obvious
argument against cloning, and yet it comes hard to us. Both
149. This is known colloquially as the "boiled frog syndrome." If a frog is thrown into
boiling water, it will jump out, but if it is in a pot and the water is gradually warmed, it will stay
in even as the temperature gets dangerously hot.
150. CALLAHAN, supra note 5, at 19.
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democracy and capitalism teach us to consider such preferences self-
justifying. Furthermore, the genetic fetishism so obvious in cloning
animates a far more accepted practice: in vitro fertilization. Despite
its diversion of medical resources from genuinely sick people and
parental love from thousands of children awaiting adoption, in vitro
fertilization enjoys widespread support.' But is the desire of two
persons to express their genetic material in a child really all that
different from the desire of one to do the same?52
Given the number of children awaiting adoption, or simply some
form of support from those better off, it is undoubtedly better that
the love and concern which the infertile now seek so assiduously to
direct toward a future human being with a genetic makeup similar to
their own be redirected to those who presently need it. Of course,
this does not mean that those who cannot naturally have a child
should bear the full burden of caring for poor children, either
through adoption or other forms of support. To the contrary, it only
indicates how important these social duties are for everyone-and
how frequently they are neglected. Regardless of how one feels
about the treatment of embryos, exotic experiments with human
reproductive cloning are a scandalous misallocation of medical
resources in a world where "more than 10 million children under 5
die each year from preventable causes such as malnutrition, unsafe
water, and the lack of even the most basic health care."'53
Admittedly, very few people now demand reproductive cloning;
present political controversy surrounds the "therapeutic cloning"
necessary to produce replacement tissues in regenerative medical
therapies. This is certainly a more noble pursuit than the effort to
"resurrect" a loved one by cloning their DNA. Yet it is worthwhile
to question it as well-especially in light of the global inequality of
medical resources. Nearly all the incremental advances toward
negative immortality touted in the media are good for their reci-
pients. But when considered as a deliberate allocation of resources in
151. In May 1994, the Princeton Survey Research Associates reported that 75% of
Americans "accepted the use of in vitro fertilization as a treatment for infertility." See LEE
SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: HOW GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CLONING WILL TRANSFORM
THE AMERICAN FAMILY 275 (1998) (quoting results of a survey conducted for Family Circle
magazine).
152. See William Eskridge & Edward Stein, Queer Clones, in CLONES AND CLONES 95,
109 (Cass Sunstein & Martha Nussbaum eds., 1998) (answering no, since "[q]ueer cloning can
be viewed as the next logical step in queer people's formation of families of choice").
153. Peter Singer, Who Deserves the September 11 Cash Pile?, SLATE, Dec. 12, 2001 at
http://slate.msn.com/?id=2059690 (citing UNITED NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, THE
STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN (2001), available at http://www.unicef.org/media/sowc02
presskit/fuilreport.htm).
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a world of scarce medical resources, they take on a different moral
valence.'54
Consider a fearful symmetry reported in 1998: As surgeons in
France perfected the first human hand transplant, rebels in Sierra
Leone terrorized opponents by cutting off their hands. 5' As the First
World chalked up yet another technological achievement, another
part of the developing world slipped into anarchy. Such juxtaposi-
tions indicate the breadth of the divergence of world living
standards. Considered on a global scale, the inequalities demand
immediate rectification. Thousands of children die each day of pre-
ventable diseases, while thousands of dollars are spend each minute
to advance technology that can only serve the richest one percent of
the planet.'56
Perhaps the new technology might someday be used for the poor
as well as the rich. Certainly, as productivity in developed nations
grows, we can expect more of our surplus to be charity for less
developed countries.157 Many progressive economists would insist
that even the most byzantine medical technologies play some role in
fueling a global economy that will eventually benefit all. The hand
surgeon may eventually volunteer for M6decins sans Frontieres-or
at least donate to it.
But one can also tell a different story about technology, a story
more expressive of the practices of inequality now manifest in the
global economy. Worldwide, more than 100 million people live on
less than one dollar a day. As their lives, practices, and concerns
grow more distant from our own it is easy to imagine the flagging of
worldwide movements of sympathy and practical solidarity.
154. Echoing the legal realists, Calabresi and Bobbitt note, "we comfort ourselves in the
belief that our society does not establish an acceptable number auto deaths, but that this figure
results from thousands of independent, atomistic decisions." GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP
BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 20 (1978). The rules governing this tightly regulated realm could
easily be changed to drastically increase or decrease the amount of deaths depending on
society's preferences. Id. Similarly, minimal reallocation of resources could vastly reduce the
number of deaths in less developed countries due to lack of basic medical care. As the United
Nations Commission on Macroeconomics and Health has determined, if "rich countries [spent]
an extra one-tenth of 1 percent of their economies on the health of the poor ... [elight million
lives a year would be saved." Editorial, Health Aid for Poor Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
2002, at A22. Peter Unger extends this logic from the political to the personal level. See PETER
UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE 10-25 (1996).
155. Compare Lawrence K. Altman, Man Moving Transplanted Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 1998, at F6, with Barbara Crossette, In West Africa, a Grisly Extension of Rebel Terror,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998, at Al.
156. See UNGER, supra note 154, at 7.
157. See David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Spreading the Wealth, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb.
2002, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/articlesDollar102.html (arguing that "the cur-
rent wave of globalization, which started around 1980, has actually promoted economic
equality and reduced poverty").
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Some advocates of negative immortality have made the connection
between the theories of distributive justice implicit in present
medical practices and the prospect of speciation on the basis of
qualitatively different terms of life. Unfortunately, their efforts to
rationalize present practices encourage their amplification in the
future. Consider the following editorial perspective on the future of
regenerative therapy:
We would face the prospect of parallel populations, of "mortals"
and of "immortals" existing alongside one another. While this
seems inherently undesirable, it is not clear that we could, or
even that we should, do anything about it for reasons of justice.
For if immortality is a good, it is doubtful ethics to deny pal-
pable goods to some people because we cannot provide them for
all .... We don't usually regard ourselves as wicked in Europe
because we perform many [organ] transplants while low-income
countries perform few or none at all.'58
The reasoning here is as facile as it is disengaged. Obviously, no
particular transplant is "wicked," but a supine indifference to the
inequality that makes them unavailable in less developed countries
almost certainly is. We in the First World cannot fault ourselves for
taking advantage of medical technology now available to us-but
only on the condition that we conscientiously try to extend it to less
developed countries. The inequality casually countenanced in this
passage is morally unacceptable. What levels of inequality in medical
care are acceptable? I can only offer a few guidelines here but
enough, and hopefully uncontroversial enough, to spur reconsidera-
tion of the present allocation of funds to new frontiers of medical
research. I draw inspiration from the example of Albert Schweitzer.
When he was twenty-nine, Schweitzer was about to engage in a
promising career as a theologian and preacher. He had committed
himself to what, he then thought, were the highest things: a life of
contemplation and moral teaching. But he was also troubled by his
decision. He reflected in his autobiography that, "[w]hile at the Uni-
versity and enjoying the happiness of being able to study and even to
produce some results in science and art, I could not help thinking
continually of others who were denied that happiness by their
material circumstances or their health."1 9 He resolved that he "must
158. John Harris, Intimations of Immortaity, SCIENCE, Apr. 2000, at 63. Harris concludes
that "it is unlikely that we can stop the progression to increased life-spans and even 'immor-
tality,' and it is doubtful that we can produce coherent ethical objections. We should start
thinking now about how we can live decently and creatively with the prospect of such lives."
Id, at 64.
159. Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, in PILGRIM SOULS: A COLLECrION
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not accept this happiness as a matter of course, but must give some-
thing in return for it.''" He thereafter committed himself to medical
service in Equatorial Africa.
Schweitzer is an exemplar, a paragon of self-sacrifice. As Susan
Wolf argues, it is unwise to make "moral saints" the measure of our
ethical aspirations.' But his example still exerts moral pull-as an
ideal we might reflect imperfectly in our own lives. For who among
us can simply ignore the plight of the poorest? Are we not called
upon to temper our enjoyment of this world's plenty with some
awareness of the Third World's scarcity? Isn't sharing more, more
than a supererogatory duty? 62
Anyone who answers "yes" to these questions should be wary of
supporting further research into technologies of life-extension in the
first world unless and until the bounty of its accomplished achieve-
ments is far more widely available in lesser developed countries.
Since the new technologies of regenerative medicine threaten to
undermine our common sense of humanity, principled research
should be premised on a principled scheme of medical distribution.
Advocates of the new medicine admit that it would be available to a
"small minority of the population even in technologically advanced
countries." 63 Even if wealthy countries committed to the universal
availability of regenerative therapies within their borders-a heroic
assumption-such progressivism would only exacerbate the divide
between their populations and those of lesser developed countries.
Given the distributional implications of aggressive pursuit of
negative immortality, comparatively wealthy societies should match
whatever resources they invest in the new technologies of life-
extension with donations to charities that aim to give the poorest
persons a minimally decent life.
Individuals, too, are obliged to rethink the ways they invest
(directly and indirectly) in the projects of negative immortality.'"
OF SPIRITUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHIES 385 (Amy Mandelker & Elizabeth Powers eds., 2000).
160. Id
161. See Susan Wolf, Moral Saints, 79 J. PHIL. 424 (1982); see also Marsha Aileen Hewitt,
Contested Positions: Modernity, Postmodernity, and the Feminist Critique of Saintly Ethics, 2
MARBURG J. RELIG. 1 (1997), at http://www.uni-marburg.de/religionswissenschaft/journal/mjr/
hewitt.html.
162. I apologize if the first-person form of address here is unduly hortatory. I mean only to
highlight that formal moral reasoning is addressed to a community of readers privileged
enough to access the texts in which its arguments appear. Although conventions often require
us to mask that fact with objective language, even the most respected contemporary philo-
sophers acknowledge that they build their work upon the "considered convictions" of their
readers. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 40-47 (rev. ed., 1999).
163. Harris, supra note 158, at 81.
164. "Of course if the state does not promote general well-being, a moral principle of
beneficence will require (better-off) people to do so." Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and
Pasquale
One strategy would be to match whatever one spends on extra-
ordinary medical technologies with donations to assure that poorer
people get access to ordinary medical technologies.'65 Since the dis-
tinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary is difficult to
apply in practice, a more reliable heuristic would be comparative
evaluation of insurance payments. In other words, a person genuine-
ly concerned about the potential of new technologies to advance
inequality of life chances would try to match whatever they spent
above the average on health insurance with donations to insure those
without coverage."
One might object: why scrutinize health care expenditures so
carefully? Even if we follow liberal theorists and accept a public duty
to assure that all persons meet a certain baseline of care, why should
our contribution to this goal be tied to our own health expendi-
tures? 67 Shouldn't people match, say, what they spend on entertain-
ment, with expenditures for the poor?
These difficult questions challenge the heuristics proposed above.
Nevertheless, health care is an area in which we need to be
concerned, not only with assuring everyone a certain baseline of
care, but also with assuring that levels of care in general do not
diverge too far from a norm. As "boutique" medical practices
become more common, already existing medical resources are being
allocated away from those who cannot afford them in order to
Liberty The Case of Required Rescue, 89 GEO. L.J. 605, 653 (2001) (defending the traditional
philosophical position that "the very same fundamental normative principles [govern] both
institutional design and personal conduct"). Those who profess to care about distributional
justice cannot just go to the polls, vote for the candidate they believe most likely to promote it,
and then blissfully enjoy whatever surplus accrues to them when the other candidate is victori-
ous. See generally G.A. COHEN, IF YOU'RE AN EGALITARIAN, WHY ARE You So RICH?
(2000). I examine the implications of Cohen's position elsewhere. See Frank Pasquale, The
Cost of Conscience: Quantifying Our Charitable Burden in an Era of Globalization (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author).
165. Traditionally, moral and political philosophers believed that the very same
fundamental normative principles governed both institutional design and personal conduct.
166. Admittedly, if the reference group for such comparative evaluation were humanity at
large, "[ftor even moderately well-off people, compliance with this [principle] would make for
a radical change of lifestyle." Murphy, supra note 164, at 644. However, a principle should not
be rejected simply because our present inability to adopt it generates cognitive dissonance. The
comparisons and guidelines suggested here are regulative ideals, meant to temper enthusiastic
investment in further biotechnological innovation with sober awareness of how few people
enjoy what has already been achieved.
167. Here I mainly refer to the theories of Ackerman, Dworkin, and Rawls. See BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 267-69 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, Justice
in the Distribution of Health Care, 38 MCGILL L.J. 883 (1993); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 152-53 (1971). For a sensitive treatment of the first two theories with many
implications for the discussion here, see Mark S. Stein, Ronald Dworkin on Redistribution to
the Disabled, 51 SYR. L. REV. 987 (2001); and Mark S. Stein, Rawls on Redistribution to the
Disabled, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 997 (1998) (discussing the proper treatment of "least
advantaged class" in deontological and utilitarian theories of distributive justice).
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provide "deluxe" care for the wealthy."~ Regenerative medicine
threatens to further inure the comparatively wealthy to the claims of
the poorest by rendering their lives qualitatively different. Most
other expenditures (such as those on entertainment) are methods of
dealing with (or distracting oneself from) a common human fate of
mortality. The new technologies of negative immortality are methods
of escaping this fate, and thus may erode the bonds of empathy upon
which the moral psychology of distributive justice is premised.169
Thus new technologies of self-enhancement merit even greater
skepticism. Raymond Kurzweil, inventor and author of The Age of
Spiritual Machines, predicts that by 2030, "we will have fully nonbio-
logical brains that are copies of human brains but vastly extended.""17
Kurzweil's prediction glosses over a difficult problem: who are the
"we" who will possess (or be possessed by) these brains? Given that
forty percent of the world's population doesn't have access to
reliable plumbing, can he possibly believe that in the next thirty
years nearly everyone will have access to these computer brains?
Will or could even all the readers of Time magazine (his presumed
audience)? 1 Realistically speaking, there will probably be as un-
equal a distribution of this future "hardware" as there is of the pres-
ent stuff.1 2 The resulting divergence between those with and without
"nonbiological brains" would make today's digital divide look like a
crack in the sidewalk-a fact other futurists readily admit. 73
168. See Pam Belluck, Doctors'New Practices Offer Deluxe Service for Deluxe Fee, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at Al (describing how groups of doctors are transitioning to "concierge
or boutique practices" by cutting the number of patients they see and giving extra attention to
patients who pay annually from $1,500 to $20,000 above medical costs covered by insurance).
169. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 129, at 340; see also George J. Annas, The Man on the
Moon, Immortality, and Other Millennial Myths. The Prospects and Perils of Human Genetic
Engineering, 49 EMORY L.J. 753 (2000) (arguing that some proposed genetic engineering
should be censured as a "crime against humanity" because of their potential for promoting
speciation).
170. Raymond Kurzweil, WillMyPCBe Smarter Than Me?, TIME, June 19,2000, at 44.
171. As Stephen Hall reports, "Access to the regenerative medicine of stem-cell and
immortalizing enzymes is most likely to be a phenomenon available only to affluent segments
of the population in the developed world." Hall, supra note 46, at 81.
172. Other writers have capably anticipated such a divided society. See, e.g., HUXLEY,
supra note 3; Bill Joy, Why the Future Doesn't Need Us, WIRED, Apr. 2000, available at
http://www.wired.com/ wired/archive/8.04/joy.html. They suggest that Kurzweil's future, and
partial, "we" is likely to command power that dwarfs that enjoyed by today's leaders. These
authors predict that human beings left unenhanced by projects of negative immortality would
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173. Princeton biologist Lee Silver predicts that genetic engineering will eventually divide
American society into two classes: "The people of one class [will be] referred to as Naturals,
while those in the second class [will be] Gene-enriched or GenRich.... [They will] grow up
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SILVER, supra note 151, at 4, 7. For a less fanciful vision of class divergence due to "assortative
mating," see MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY 31, 45, 180 (1992).
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Admittedly, Kurzweil's aims are far removed from the practical
aims of most medical researchers. Their advocates can relate
thousands of stories detailing the promise of regenerative medicine
for the sick. In an account of the political controversy over stem
cells, New York Times reporter Jane Brody mentions the fate of her
father, who suffered a heart attack that permanently weakened him:
"He survived, but could not pick up his grandchildren, carry a
suitcase or do the gardening he loved. Had there been stem cells that
could have regenerated his damaged heart muscle.., his remaining
years would certainly have been better."" As a practical response to
the problems of the aged and sick, regenerative medicine expresses a
deeply compassionate human desire to end suffering.
But we need to remember that this is, for the foreseeable future, a
narrowly directed compassion. A daughter may justifiably feel that
her suffering father is due every conceivable medical intervention.
But can any moral observer support the inequality of resources that
permits him to command tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars of
medical attention, while denying millions of other persons the
chance even to see a doctor? The two perspectives must be recon-
ciled. For most residents of the developed world, marginal alloca-
tions of resources from oneself and one's family, to those who need
them most (perhaps via tithing), is a step toward reconciliation.
As medical care advances, it becomes harder and harder to
imagine a "natural" death. Regenerative medicine promises a bot-
tomless toolkit of extraordinary measures capable of reversing the
effects of time, disease, and accident. We rightly consider many of
these advances great goods, but they also burden us with extra-
ordinary responsibilities. "[B]y look[ing] upon death as a correctable
biological deficiency, [and] conflating human action and the
independent actions of nature," modern medicine has "imput[ed] to
human beings an all-encompassing responsibility for death."'75 It is
hard to face the fact that a decision not to buy, say, the very best
insurance and medical care, might result in a shorter life.
But before sinking ever more resources into the pursuit of a few
more years of life, it is important to consider the alternatives for-
saken by doing so.176 We need some way of balancing duties to self,
174. Brody, supra note 34, at F8.
175. CALLAHAN, supra note 5, at 58. Callahan observes that modern medicine has come,
"in its working research, and often clinical agenda, to look upon death as a correctable
biological deficiency." Id.
176. Health care expenditures have outpaced inflation for over a decade. See CENTERS
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, REPORT DETAILS NATIONAL HEALTH CARE
SPENDING INCREASES IN 2000, available at http://cms.hhs.gov/media/press/press release.asp?
Counter=328 (disclosing that "[h]ealth care spending in the United States rose to $1.3 trillion
in 2000, a 6.9 percent increase over the previous year").
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family, and world. A conscientious effort to extend extant medicine
to all is the first step toward legitimizing investment in technologies
that now, and for the foreseeable future, will be exclusively enjoyed
in the world's most developed countries.
VI. CONCLUSION
The task and potential greatness of mortals lie in their
ability to produce things-works and deeds and words-
which would deserve to be and, at least to a degree, are at
home in everlastingness.
-Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition"
Our age demands a principled response to technological advance.
Instead, the media confronts us with a dizzying array of perspectives.
Stem-cell research is censured one day and praised the next. Some
declare genetically engineered crops and animals to be a crime
against nature; others believe they will end world hunger. Unques-
tioned good threatens to drag in its wake incalculable harm.
Most Americans approach these developments with a curious
mixture of optimism and fatalism. We hope consumer demand will
somehow domesticate ominous research agendas. Faith in the invis-
ible hand feeds on a tacit conviction that "progress" is inevitable and
unchannelable.
Those who challenge quiescence are usually written off as Cas-
sandras and not without reason. Even reflective critics of technologi-
cal advance offer little more than vivid pessimism to confront the
blind optimism of popular culture. Although their worry about
specific innovations is wise, it does not amount to a principled re-
sponse to technological advance. A constructive anxiety depends on
a coherent vision of a common future. In other words, we need to
determine not only what technology shouldn't do, but also what it
should do.
Unfortunately, both religious and secular critics of regenerative
medicine have so far concentrated on the former far more than the
latter. Church leaders have focused nearly all their criticism on the
destruction of embryos-leaving them little basis for critically
evaluating technologies that "save" embryos by manipulating other
human biological materials in even more disturbing ways. Secular
critics have shifted the debate from the methods to the possible
consequences of regenerative medicine, evoking a Brave New World
of genetically engineered speciation. But even if regenerative medi-
177. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 19 (1958).
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cine were certain to lead to a dystopic future, its principled propo-
nents could still argue that its present benefits are too great to
ignore.
However, they cannot ignore the medical projects we presently
forego by investing in regenerative care. While a Brave New World
is a long way off (if it is coming at all), our world presents its own
nightmares of inequality and qualitatively different life chances.
They may not be socially engineered, but they threaten to be
reinforced by the prospective distribution of regenerative therapies.
We only pursue them at risk of undermining our already fragile
sense of a common humanity.
Like any great human project, medicine expresses the best and
worst, the grandeur and misre, of human nature.178 In coming years
we will face ever deeper demands from the new medicine ranging
from federal funding for research to permission for new human-
subject experiments. As potential methods for relieving suffering, all
the proposed innovations deserve a hearing. However, we cannot al-
low the humanistic project of healing the sick to metamorphose into
an elite quest for invulnerability. Further research into regenerative
therapies should be conditioned on the wider availability of medicine
that we take for granted-and that much of the world now finds
hopelessly out of reach.
178. "The more light we have, the more greatness and the more baseness we discover in
men." PASCAL, PENSEES 251 (W.F. Trotter trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1952) (1660)
(number 443).
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